explaining that when a person is permitted to appear in opposition to an application to a zoning hearing board and permitted to cross- examine witnesses and present evidence, he or she is a party to those proceedings and is entitled to appeal an adverse decision as an aggrieved party
How later courts described this case
- explaining that when a person is permitted to appear in opposition to an application to a zoning hearing board and permitted to cross- examine witnesses and present evidence, he or she is a party to those proceedings and is entitled to appeal an adverse decision as an aggrieved party
- applying Baker to hold that an individual who was permitted to appear in opposition to an application by a landowner to the zoning board in Pittsburgh, to cross-examine witnesses, and to present evidence, was a party to those proceedings and was entitled to appeal the board’s grant of the landowner’s application as an aggrieved party
- holding that the presiding judge had “an obligation not to consider ex parte communications” from Justice Larsen
- noting “[t]he appearance of impropriety raised by the improper ex parte communications” was “exacerbated” when the individual exerting pressure stood in a “position of authority” over the decisionmaker
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Abrogated on other grounds by In Re Angeles Roca First Judicial District Philadelphia County, 173 A.3d 1176 (2017)
616 A.2d 529, 592-93 (Pa. 1992), abrogated on other grounds, In re Angeles Roca First Judicial Dist. Phila. Cty., 173 A.3d 1176, 1184
The opinion
PAPADAKOS, Justice,
dissenting.
I most reluctantly dissent from the action taken by my colleagues in adopting the recommendation of the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board. I do not reach the merits, as my colleagues have, and I do not question the correctness of the decision on the merits as may appear in the record filed with us by the Judicial Inquiry and Review Board.
Rather, my deep concern arises from the fact that I believe that the entire proceedings have been tainted with procedural infractions of the rules and the substitution of members of the Board participating in successive hearings.
I believe that it was error for the Board to file with us a record on charges they found to be unsubstantiated and for which the Board made no recommendation. I believe this to be a violation of the constitutional mandate of confidentiality for all matters in which no recommendation of sanction is made to the Supreme Court.
The record should have been filed with us which included only the charge which the Board found to have been substantiated and for which the recommendation of public censure was made.
*490 My objections to the composition of the Board which concluded the proceedings against Mr. Justice Larsen and my views as to the proper procedures to have been followed have been fully articulated in my Dissenting Opinion entered in Larsen v. Kaufinann, et al., 525 Pa. 278 , 579 A.2d 1302 (1990), and need not be restated here.
However, in response to my colleagues’ assertion that the participation of the challenged members did not change the outcome, I must point out that this conclusion lies in the realm of conjecture. The recommendation presented to us is surely the product of a compromise between four who would have opted for a more severe sanction and four who settled for much less. Had the four who settled for much less not met the serious opposition of the other four, would they have carried the day for complete exoneration? Either the image of the judiciary is being severely damaged or the rights of the Respondent have been trampled upon. Under the present circumstances, we cannot know.
Suffice it to say that, in my view, the adding of new charges to proceedings under way, the participation in new hearings by Board members whose terms had expired, and the refusal of this Court to resolve the constitutional issues raised by Mr. Justice Larsen, all of which were held as interlocutory by a divided court on the premise that we can cure any defect upon the filing of a record and recommendation, call for a remand to a properly constituted Judicial Inquiry and Review Board which has jurisdiction to hear and resolve the charge underlying the recommendation of public censure.
The errors alleged by Mr. Justice Larsen and the violations of constitutional rights which he claims in his various petitions to this Court which were held to be interlocutory by a divided Court remain unresolved. The Board cannot resolve these issues as a trial court may. Its only duty is to make a recommendation to our Court as to a proper sanction that may be imposed. Only this Court can now answer those issues.
I realize that this has been a long and trying experience for all parties involved, including this Court which has been put to the unenvious task of judging one of its own on charges of *491 judicial misconduct. The resolution wrought by my colleagues may bring to a close, once and for all, this sad episode and it may be the wise thing to do. However, I feel that the constitutional infirmities I find to have been committed by the Board can only be exonerated by remanding for new hearings on the charge submitted to us.
I therefore dissent and would order a remand.