Opinion

Commonwealth v. Spetzer

  • 572 Pa. 17
  • 813 A.2d 707
  • 2002 Pa. LEXIS 3116
Court
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Dec 31, 2002
Status
Published
Author
Nigro
On the bench
Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin
Cited by
27 cases
Authority
More cited than 10.1%

holding that the spousal confidential communication privilege of section 5914 is inapplicable in a criminal proceeding because the declarant spouse could have no reasonable expectation of marital confidentiality in statements made regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse in light of section 6381(c) of the Law.

How later courts described this case

  • holding that the spousal confidential communication privilege of section 5914 is inapplicable in a criminal proceeding because the declarant spouse could have no reasonable expectation of marital confidentiality in statements made regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse in light of section 6381(c) of the Law.
  • stating, “there are instances where the circumstances surrounding marital communications indicate that the communications are intended to create or further disharmony in the marital relationship; in those instances, the privilege yields.”
  • holding that the marital privilege yields when "the cireum-stances surrounding marital communications indicate that the communications are intended to create or further disharmony in the marital relationship"
  • holding that the marital privilege yields when "the circumstances surrounding marital communications indicate that the communications are intended to create or further disharmony in the marital relationship"

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Justice NIGRO,

Concurring.

I agree with the majority that Mrs. Spetzer’s testimony regarding conversations she had with Appellee was admissible. *45 I disagree, however, with the majority’s rationale that Appellee’s communications were not confidential under 42 Pa.C.S. § 5914 because the communications did not promote marital harmony. See Maj. Op. at 721-22 (citing Seitz v. Seitz, 170 Pa. 71 , 32 A. 578 (1895)). Rather, I would find that the challenged communications were admissible under section 6381(c) of the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”), which, as the Commonwealth argues, modifies the spousal privilege set forth in section 5914. Specifically, section 6381(c) states:

Privileged communications.—Except for privileged communications between a lawyer and a client and between a minister and a penitent, a privilege of confidential communication between husband and wife or between any professional person, including, but not limited to, physicians, psychologists, counselors, employees of hospitals, clinics, daycare centers and schools and their patients or clients, shall not constitute grounds for excluding evidence at any proceeding regarding child abuse or the cause of child abuse.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6381(c) (emphasis added). In enacting this provision, I believe that the legislature made a public policy decision to override section 5914’s spousal privilege in proceedings, such as this one, which involve allegations of child abuse. Therefore, in my view, this Court need not go any further than section 6381(c) to find that the challenged statements in the instant case were admissible.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.