discussing the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule and also explaining why a statement which appears to be hearsay nevertheless may be admissible if offered for reasons other than proving the truth of the matter asserted
How later courts described this case
- discussing the “state of mind” exception to the hearsay rule and also explaining why a statement which appears to be hearsay nevertheless may be admissible if offered for reasons other than proving the truth of the matter asserted
- parties agreed that antibiotics are appropriate if there is a likelihood of bleeding during a dental procedure, but disagreed as to whether the dentist should have predicted that the patient would bleed
- quashal of the appeal is the appropriate course as “there is no authority which would establish the right of an appellate court to entertain an interlocutory appeal in the face of the refusal ... of either party to enter a judgment”
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Romeo v. Manuel, 1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3703 (1997)
Cluver, however, is distinguishable because in that case the defendant claimed that decedent was eontributorily negligent by failing to take penicillin.
The opinion
CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
Since I feel that the majority makes an egregious error in undermining historic precedent which is the bedrock of our system of appellate review, I vigorously dissent. The majority gratuitously reviews this clearly interlocutory appeal from post-verdict motions and establishes a precedent which, if followed, could wreak havoc with established canons of juris *576 diction in our appellate courts. The appealing defendants have steadfastly refused to enter judgment citing what can only be described as counsel’s self-proclaimed conflict of economic interests which counsel perceives to exist between the named defendants and their insurance carrier. Appellees, on the other hand, have refused to enter judgment for undisclosed reasons and seek instead a quashal with prejudice.
The majority has acted without precedent. Purported authority is said to be found in three cases which, in fact, stand for an entirely different proposition of law. In McCormick v. Northeastern Bank of Pennsylvania, 522 Pa. 251 , 561 A.2d 328 (1989), the court regarded “as done that which ought to have been done” in order to perfect the record in a case where there was no controversy as to the entry of judgment. Similarly, in Summit Fasteners v. Harleysville, 410 Pa.Super. 56 , 599 A.2d 203 (1991), the failure to enter judgment was not in controversy and our court engaged in the “ought to be done” fiction. Finally, in Murphy v. Murphy, 410 Pa.Super. 146 , 599 A.2d 647 (1991), our court chose to interpret a lower court opinion in a manner which met the standard of finality necessary to our jurisdiction. There is no suggestion that the entry of a properly worded order was a matter of contention between the parties.
Thus, there is no authority which would establish the right of an appellate court to entertain an interlocutory appeal in the face of the refusal for their own reasons of either party to enter a judgment. The majority recognizes the unprecedented nature of its consideration of the merits, but gratuitously undertakes its review on the basis of “judicial economy” to “efficiently dispose of an appeal”. To the contrary, the majority’s precedent, if allowed to stand, will invite confusion in our appellate courts and would furnish a precedent for consideration of interlocutory appeals whenever two judges on a panel consider that the appeal, despite its interlocutory nature, should conveniently be considered. Further, the majority rule supercedes Pa.R.A.P. 1311 Interlocutory Appeals by Permission since an interlocutory appeal may now be heard by a *577 panel without the approval of a majority of the commissioned judges of this court. See Superior Court I.O.P. 302.
The new and radical rule adopted by the majority will seriously affect other established rights and duties which flow from the final order—entry of judgment principle. For example, the time for taking an appeal (Pa.R.A.P. 903) will no longer be fixed from the date of entry of judgment when a panel entertains interlocutory appeals such as the present. Other substantive rights may be affected in bypassing the requirement of entry of judgment. These include collateral attacks on a judgment, merger and bar of causes of action and defenses; establishment of liens; calculation of post-judgment interest and issues relating to the conclusiveness of an adjudication. It is worthy of note that in the instant matter there are unresolved disputes between the parties as to the adequacy of the appeal bond, as to the responsibility of the insurance carrier for costs, as to Rule 238 damages and post-judgment interest—all of which militate against the majority’s unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction.
Finally, we observe that as a result of the majority disposition there is as yet no entry of judgment in this case and presumably an appeal will be pursued to the supreme court with the consequent result that further time will thus elapse while this interlocutory appeal is considered without the appellants having a judgment entered against them.
Appellees request this court to quash with a sanction of prohibiting further pursuing an appeal at a later date. No authority for this severe sanction is furnished to us. Nor is there any explanation for the failure of appellees to enter judgment, a course available to them and certainly a necessary precedent to any effort to execute upon the verdict that they have won. Pa.R.C.P. 227.1; Pa.R.A.P. 301.
I would quash the appeal and deny the request for sanctions.