concluding that a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument concerning the possibility of commutation were “a fair response to defense counsel’s anticipated argument that a life sentence meant that [the] appellant would spend his entire life in prison”
How later courts described this case
- concluding that a prosecutor’s comments during closing argument concerning the possibility of commutation were “a fair response to defense counsel’s anticipated argument that a life sentence meant that [the] appellant would spend his entire life in prison”
- holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defendant to ask whether prospective jurors “were aware that in Pennsylvania a sentence of life imprisonment meant life imprisonment without the possibility of parole”
- stating, a weight claim may be premised on the assertion that no reasonable jury could have reached its verdict unless the verdict were the result of confusion, bias, or prejudice
- “[Q]uestioning potential jurors regarding their personal knowledge of the law in Pennsylvania does not aid in the inquiry of whether they will be able to follow the law applicable to the matter as instructed by the trial court.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CAPPY, Justice,
concurring.
I join in the opinion of the majority with the exception of the majority’s interpretation of the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 , 106 S.Ct. 1683 , 90 L.Ed.2d 27 (1986), as expressed in footnote 19. (Opinion at pg. 610).
In Turner , seven Justices of the Court agreed that a defendant accused of an interracial capital crime is entitled to voir dire prospective jurors on the issue of racial bias. Of the seven Justices agreeing on that issue, one concurred in the result only, four Justices found that the error in refusing to permit voir dire on racial bias affected only the penalty phase of the proceeding, and two Justices found the error affected both the guilt and penalty phases. The two Justices in the dissent found no error.
The majority opinion herein reads Turner as limiting voir dire questions on racial bias to capital cases in jurisdictions where the jury has greater discretion in imposing a death sentence than juries in capital cases in Pennsylvania. It is this limitation of Turner with which I cannot agree. In my opinion the holding of Turner was not restricted by the range of discretion that a particular sentencing jury wields under the Virginia capital sentencing scheme; rather, the court was focusing upon the greater discretion possessed by penalty *616 phase juries as opposed to guilt phase juries. The language of Turner which explains this distinction is as follows:
The inadequacy of voir dire in this case requires that petitioner’s death sentence be vacated. It is not necessary, however, that he be retried on the issue of guilt. Our judgment in this case is that there was an unacceptable risk of racial prejudice infecting the capital sentencing proceeding. This judgment is based on a conjunction of three factors: the fact that the crime charged involved interracial violence, the broad discretion given the jury at the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing in a capital case. At the guilt phase of petitioner’s trial, the jury had no greater discretion than it would have had if the crime charged had been noncapital murder.
476 U.S. at 37 , 106 S.Ct. at 1689 (emphasis in original).
Accordingly, as I do not agree with the views expressed by the majority regarding the Turner decision, I write to disassociate myself from that portion of the majority opinion.
FLAHERTY, C.J., joins.