stating that “where [a] mistake is patent and obvious” trial courts have the power to correct or alter a criminal sentence “even though the 30-day appeal period has expired”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “where [a] mistake is patent and obvious” trial courts have the power to correct or alter a criminal sentence “even though the 30-day appeal period has expired”
- examining sentencing transcript and determining that the sentencing order correctly reflected the imposed sentence and therefore did not contain an error that could be corrected after thirty days
- stating that “once the thirty-day period is over, the trial court loses the power to alter its orders.”
- the trial court has jurisdiction to modify an otherwise final judgment of sentence where the sentencing order contains a patent or obvious mistake
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CONCURRING OPINION BY
GRACI, J.
¶ 1 I join the thorough opinion of the court. I write separately to note my concern that the trial court improperly considered the fact that Appellee had not yet been paroled in deciding to award him relief.
¶ 2 There is never any right to parole. See Commonwealth v. Stark, 698 A.2d 1327, 1333 (Pa.Super.1997) (convicted persons in Pennsylvania have no constitutional or inherent rights to parole). “Parole is a matter of grace and mercy shown to a prisoner who has demonstrated to the Board’s satisfaction his ability to function as a law abiding member of society.” Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 760 A.2d 883, 886 (Pa.Super.2000) (quoting Stark, 698 A.2d at 1333 ). When a convict is sentenced, he or she has no legitimate expectation except to serve the maximum sentence. See Commonwealth v. Daniel 430 Pa. 642 , 243 A.2d 400, 403 (1968) (“the maximum sentence is the real sentence”); Gundy v. Com., Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 82 Pa.Cmwlth. 618 , 478 A.2d 139, 141 (1984) (stating, “[t]he sentence imposed for a criminal offense is the maximum sentence and the minimum sentence merely sets the date prior to which a prisoner may not be paroled”).
¶ 3 Parole of prisoners sentenced to more than two years imprisonment such as Appellee is exclusively within the province of the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole. See Commonwealth v. Tilghman, 438 Pa.Super. 313 , 652 A.2d 390, 391 (1995) (citations omitted); see also 61 P.S. §§ 331.17 and 331.21. The sentencing court has a right to be heard on the question of parole, but does not control the decision. See 61 P.S. § 331.18. Under our parole system, the expiration of the minimum sentence merely allows a prisoner to be considered for parole. See Rogers v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 555 Pa. 285 , 724 A.2d 319 , 321 n. 2 (1999) (citations omitted). A prisoner otherwise has no entitlement to parole. See id. Parole, under these circumstances, is a matter of legislative grace vested in the discretion of the Parole Board. See Tilghman, 652 A.2d at 391 ; see also 61 P.S. §§ 331.17 and 331.21. It is not a matter of concern for the court. These “rules” have not changed since Appellee was originally sentenced. They were the rules in place then.
¶ 4 Moreover, it is absolutely irrelevant that the trial court may have thought that Appellee should or would have been released by now. (R. 81a-85a) These are matters within the exclusive discretion of the Parole Board, and, on this record, we have no idea why the Board has not deemed it appropriate to grant parole to Appellee. This is not a matter into which the courts can (or should) inquire.