stating that “[although not apparent from its, express terms, the language from Section 203 ... confers upon the statutory employer immunity from suit. This is because. Section 303(a) ... makes the workers' compensation system the exclusive, remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[although not apparent from its, express terms, the language from Section 203 ... confers upon the statutory employer immunity from suit. This is because. Section 303(a) ... makes the workers' compensation system the exclusive, remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.”
- determining that Delaware County and the Prison Board are separate legal entities
- describing the “classic statutory employer situation” in which “a property owner hires the general contractor, who hires a subcontractor to do specialized work on the jobsite, and an employee of the subcontractor is injured in the course of his employment”
- indicating that Sections 203 and 302(b) are the two "primary provisions in the Act that define the rights and responsibilities of a statutory employer,” without reference to Section 302(a)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice CAPPY,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, joining only that portion of Justice Castille’s dissenting opinion which would conclude that the legislation creating the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors is sufficient to satisfy the contract element of the test set out in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287 , 153 A. 424 (1930) for determining whether a party is a statutory employer under Section 203 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. 77 P.S. § 52.