stating that “[although not apparent from its, express terms, the language from Section 203 ... confers upon the statutory employer immunity from suit. This is because. Section 303(a) ... makes the workers' compensation system the exclusive, remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “[although not apparent from its, express terms, the language from Section 203 ... confers upon the statutory employer immunity from suit. This is because. Section 303(a) ... makes the workers' compensation system the exclusive, remedy for an injured employee seeking redress from an employer for an on-the-job injury.”
- determining that Delaware County and the Prison Board are separate legal entities
- describing the “classic statutory employer situation” in which “a property owner hires the general contractor, who hires a subcontractor to do specialized work on the jobsite, and an employee of the subcontractor is injured in the course of his employment”
- indicating that Sections 203 and 302(b) are the two "primary provisions in the Act that define the rights and responsibilities of a statutory employer,” without reference to Section 302(a)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice NIGRO,
Concurring.
I agree with the plurality that the Delaware County Board of Prison Inspectors is not immune from suit as a statutory employer under section 203 of the Worker’s Compensation Act. Although I dissented in Fonner v. Shandon, Inc., 555 Pa. 370 , 724 A.2d 903 (1999), because I believed that a statutory employer should be required to show that it assumed responsi *261 bility for providing workers’ compensation to the injured employee before statutory immunity may attach, I recognize that our current law does not impose such a requirement. I remain concerned, however, that the five elements set forth in McDonald v. Levinson Steel Co., 302 Pa. 287 , 153 A. 424 (1930), may be insufficient to prevent one deemed a statutory employer under section 203 from receiving an unfair advantage at the expense of an injured party. In that regard, 1 agree with the plurality that we must be cognizant that by providing for statutory employer immunity,, the General Assembly has in effect altered the fundamental compromise underlying the workers’ compensation system, i.e., that an employer is granted immunity from suit in return for providing workers’ compensation benefits to employees for work-related injuries. I therefore believe that statutory employer immunity must be strictly construed and the five McDonald requirements must be unequivocally satisfied before immunity will attach.