holding that a public housing authority may terminate benefits conferred by section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, for the violent criminal activity of a family member without having to prove that the violent criminal activity threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents
How later courts described this case
- holding that a public housing authority may terminate benefits conferred by section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C. § 1437f, for the violent criminal activity of a family member without having to prove that the violent criminal activity threatens the health, safety, or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by other residents
- explaining that if the “PHA approves the tenancy, the PHA and the owner enter into a [HAP] contract . . . under which the PHA makes rental payments to subsidize occupancy,” and, in turn, “the owner and the now-Section 8 participant enter into a lease for the subsidized unit”
- holding public housing authority may terminate Section 8 benefits for violent crime of family member without having to prove that the activity threatens health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment
- because Congress, in enacting Section 8 of the United States Housing Act, did not speak to the question of whether a public housing authority may lawfully terminate the lease of a public housing tenant if a member of the tenant’s household or guest engages in drug related activity without the tenant’s actual or reasonable knowledge, examination of other factors to discern Congress’s intent, including the interpretation of the agency responsible for implementing the Housing Act, was warranted
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Justice SAYLOR,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion generally, subject to the following:
First, I read the majority’s issue-narrowing logic, see Majority Opinion, at 1209-10, as merely an indication that the Court is limiting its review to the correctness of the reasoning of the Commonwealth Court and common pleas court, leaving open other questions concerning the validity of the HUD regulations at issue and the underlying administrative action of the PHA in terminating Appellee’s Section 8 benefits.
Second, although I acknowledge that, like the majority, the United States Supreme Court has employed the yardstick of “reasonableness” in delimiting the class of substantive regulations that are due the greatest judicial deference, I believe that, given the broader context, it would be preferable to employ the term “reasoned.” In this regard, where, as here, there is an express Congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to an administrative agency, see Majority Opinion, at 1208 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 8535 (d)), the Supreme Court has maintained that resultant legislative regulations must be accorded controlling weight “unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 , 104 S.Ct. 2778, 2782 , 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); accord 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A). 1 Notably, this Court has distinguished *579 similar conceptions from reasonableness review in our own administrative jurisprudence. See Fraternal Order of Police v. PLRB, 557 Pa. 586, 592-93 , 735 A.2d 96, 99-100 (1999). See generally Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 Chi.-Kent L.Rev. 1253, 1263 (1997) (“in effect, the [Supreme C]ourt has transformed the Chevron step two question of whether the agency action was ‘reasonable’ into a question of whether it was ‘reasoned.’ ”). While superficially this may seem a modest point, the employment of the elastic reasonableness rubric in the administrative arena has in the past led to divergent results and carries the potential for fostering the appearance that courts may be substituting their judgments for those of agencies, rather than limiting review to a determination whether the agency has acted within the boundaries of its lawful mandate. Cf Fraternal Order of Police, 557 Pa. at 592-93 , 735 A.2d at 99-100 .
Phrased as such, I agree with the majority that HUD’s legislative regulations in this area are reasoned, a permissible application of delegated authority under the Housing Act, and not arbitrary, capricious, or ultra vires on their face, where: national housing policy is intended to remedy unsafe housing conditions, see 42 U.S.C. § 1437 (a)(1)(A); tenancy of households whose members have engaged in violent criminal activity, regardless of its proximity, may reasonably be viewed as contrary to such policy; and, as Mr. Justice Nigro emphasizes, the regulations do not require termination, but rather, on their terms implicate the sound discretion of the local housing authority.
. Significantly, in its analysis, Chewon ultimately found and relied on an implicit delegation of legislative authority to support broad deference in favor of an administrative regulation. Chevron 467 U.S. at 865-66 , 104 S.Ct. at 2792-93 . The Court treated the case for broad deference in the face of an express delegation as settled, see id. at 843- *579 44, 104 S.Cl. at 2782, and, obviously, the strongest justification for deference is presented in such circumstances, as here.