reaching the merits of a mandamus action challenging a county's exercise of discretion under a public bidding statute
How later courts described this case
- reaching the merits of a mandamus action challenging a county's exercise of discretion under a public bidding statute
- "If the statute were held to create such a remedy [i.e., lost profits], then taxpayers, whom the statute was designed to protect, would be injured twice whenever the school board failed to award a contract to the lowest responsible bidder: the first time, through the unjustified additional expenditure of funds on the awarded contract, and then, a second time through the necessity for paying a judgment for lost profits to the aggrieved low bidder."
- county jail food supply contract could be awarded to higher bidder who would provide food service training for mentally handicapped
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE FREEMAN, also concurring:
I concur in the judgment of this case, but like Justice Heiple, I disagree with the majority’s analysis.
I agree with the majority that the petition for mandamus was properly dismissed because plaintiff was no longer entitled to that particular form of relief or entitled to monetary damages. I am unpersuaded, however, that the County’s determination of the "lowest responsible bidder,” as alleged, did not suggest an arbitrary exercise of discretion.
According to the statutory criteria, the County, in determining the lowest responsible bidder, shall take into consideration the supplied articles’ "suitability to the requirements of the county.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1991, ch. 34, par. 5 — 1022(2).) The county board’s minutes reflect that it awarded the contract to the Resource Center because of the Resource Center’s past performance and food service training program for the mentally handicapped. On its face, this determination does not indicate the consideration contemplated under the statute. Furthermore, I am unconvinced by the majority’s reasoning that "reasonable benefits to the County arising from [the contract] bid” are properly considered as an aspect of the food service’s suitability. The majority’s reasoning appears to stretch the statutory criteria too far so as to conclude that no favoritism was indicated.
Additionally, the distinction made by the majority between this case and Cardinal Glass Co. is not substantially meaningful. I cannot accept that a preference for local contractors, and their services, suggests favoritism any more than a preference based on a contractor’s past performance and the operation of a social program.
Considering the obligation to construe pleadings liberally, based on the factual allegations and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, the allegations here suggested some degree of favoritism.