noting that evidence that the central trial witness who testified against the defendant had told fellow inmates that the defendant was not involved in the killing did not require a new trial. Such evidence could show only that the witness “had a bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely” and “would be admissible only for purposes of impeaching” the witness, which was “an insufficient basis for granting a new trial.”
How later courts described this case
- noting that evidence that the central trial witness who testified against the defendant had told fellow inmates that the defendant was not involved in the killing did not require a new trial. Such evidence could show only that the witness “had a bias, interest, or motive to testify falsely” and “would be admissible only for purposes of impeaching” the witness, which was “an insufficient basis for granting a new trial.”
- Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Heiple and Bilandic, JJ.
- the defendant had no criminal record, the murder was motivated by the defendant’s husband’s affair, and the murder was an isolated incident
- “Notwithstanding defendant’s argument that cross-examination of [the witness] might have been treated differently, we cannot say that trial counsel’s approach fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and, thus, defendant’s trial counsel was not deficient.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring: Although I join in Justice McMorrow’s separate opinion, I write briefly to address a point raised in the dissent. The dissenting justices note that the present case is distinguishable from the cases relied upon by the majority because those cases involved defendants who were acting in response to what this court considered "mental or emotional disturbances or abnormally stressful circumstances.” 177 Ill. 2d at 113 (Miller, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Heiple and Bilandic, JJ.). To the extent that this statement can be viewed as standing for the proposition that without such a "triggering” event, any argument regarding excessiveness must fail, I disagree. In the past, this court has recognized that each capital case is unique and, therefore, must be evaluated on its own facts in order to determine the appropriateness of the death sentence. See People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). Our ability to reverse a sentence of death on the basis of excessiveness is not restricted to only those cases containing explosive or otherwise sudden mental or psychological episodes. In my view, the Johnson-CarlsonBuggs line of cases does not stand for the proposition that this court will vacate a sentence of death whenever a defendant can demonstrate the existence of two mitigating factors, i.e., the lack of a significant history of prior criminal conduct combined with a sudden, explosive episode of violence, resulting from extreme mental or emotional disturbance. More important, I do not read these cases to command affirmance of the death sentence in the absence of either or both of these factors of mitigation. Rather, this court must remain cognizant of the fact that the unique nature of capital cases requires "consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.” People v. Pasch, 152 Ill. 2d 133, 201 (1992), quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 , 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). Consequently, this court is duty-bound to reverse a capital sentence on this basis whenever the record demonstrates that the imposition of the sentence would not serve the deterrent and retributive purposes of capital sentencing. See People v. Tye, 141 Ill. 2d 1, 30 (1990), citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 880 , 96 S. Ct. 2909, 2929-30 (1976) (plurality opinion). Contrary to the implication raised by the dissent, Carlson and its progeny represent "nothing more, and nothing less, than a recognition of this court’s „ responsibility in every death penalty case to carefully consider the character of the defendant and the circumstances of his crime before we sanction the termination of his life.” Tye, 141 Ill. 2d at 37 (Ryan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Clark and Calvo, JJ.).
JUSTICE McMORROW joins in this special concurrence.