observing that “proof that an automobile accident ‘arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention, forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 5 judgment on his part,’ is not sufficient evidence of recklessness”
How later courts described this case
- observing that “proof that an automobile accident ‘arose out of the inadvertence, lack of attention, forgetfulness or thoughtfulness of the driver of a vehicle, or from an error of Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A05-1608-CR-1919 | March 22, 2017 Page 4 of 5 judgment on his part,’ is not sufficient evidence of recklessness”
- concluding that even if testimony regarding defendants failure to contact police officer was Fifth Amendment violation, trial court's admonishment to jury cured any error
- applying rule under the Guest Statute to criminal recklessness case involving driver who fell asleep at the wheel and declining to adopt a lesser standard of proof in the criminal context than is required in the civil context
- reversing conviction as merely falling asleep at the wheel without evidence of consciously disregarding a substantial risk is not enough to prove recklessness
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*213 DARDEN, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur as to Issues I, III, and IV. With respect to Issue II, I respectfully dissent.
It has long been the law in Indiana that criminal statutes are "strictly construed against the State." Sunday v. State, 720 N.E.2d 716, 719 (Ind.1999); see also e.g., Fahnestock v. State, 102 Ind. 156 , 1 N.E. 872 , 877 (1885). We look to the "plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the language unless the statute itself provides a contrary meaning." Sunday, 720 N.E.2d at 718 .
The statute defines the offense of false informing as the giving of "false information in the official investigation of the commission of a crime, knowing the information to be false." Ind.Code § 35-44-2-2(d)(a). Thus, as I read the statute, the law enforcement officer must have been conducting "an official investigation of the commission of a crime" in order for the provision of "false information" to constitute the offense. Id. Here, the record indicates that the responding officers were investigating an accident and had no indi-cia of criminal activity at the time Claney was questioned. Because the officer was not conducting an "official investigation of the commission of a crime" at the time Clancy informed the officer that Joshua was driving, I would reverse Clancy's conviction in that regard.