suppression not required where "[t]he only possible reasonable conclusion which [could] be drawn from a reading of the ... affidavit" was that the affiant, "as required by [c. 276,] § 2B, as amended, appeared before the court clerk and swore that the allegations by him subscribed were true"
How later courts described this case
- suppression not required where "[t]he only possible reasonable conclusion which [could] be drawn from a reading of the ... affidavit" was that the affiant, "as required by [c. 276,] § 2B, as amended, appeared before the court clerk and swore that the allegations by him subscribed were true"
- upheld search of visitor's day pack found in basement following visitor's lawful arrest
- search of customer's coat hanging on rack in barber shop upheld under valid premises search warrant where object of search could have been concealed within coat
- upheld search of visitor's jacket where warrant authorized arrest of all persons present in public place
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Kaplan, J.
(dissenting in part). I think the search of the overcoat of the. defendant Marsh was illegal, though I must own that the question is a close one on which there is not much cogent authority. I would disregard the language of the warrant about “persons present” which is evidently a vestigial remain of a repealed statute. Taken merely to authorize a search of the described premises, the warrant does not cover a search of the person of a customer sitting in a barber chair. This the court’s opinion concedes. But then, I submit, the same immunity should extend to that customer’s briefcase within his arm’s reach, and by reasonable analogy, his overcoat on a hook on the wall. The overcoat should be considered within the customer’s “possession,” which is to say within the ambit of his person. Another way of looking at the case is to reason that if the warrant is read to cover Marsh’s overcoat, it was to that extent issued without probable cause. I believe there was a breach of Marsh’s “constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy” (Harlan, J., concurring in Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 ), a conclusion strengthened rather than weakened by the fact that the barbershop was a kind of public place; it invited transients who might want a haircut rather than a “fix.” The nature of the locus may indeed serve to distinguish United States v. Teller, 397 F. 2d 494 (7th Cir.), cert, den. sub nom. Teller v. United States, 393 U. S. 937 , 1 United States v. Johnson, 475 F. 2d 977 (D. C. Cir.) (one judge concurring in part and dissenting in part), and United States v. Riccitelli, 259 F. Supp. 665 (D. Conn.), cases cited for sustaining the present search.
The Teller case rested in part on Harris v. United States, 331 U. S. 145 , which was later qualified in Chimel v. California, 395 U. S. 752 .