stating that in a jury trial on a retaliatory discharge claim the “court decides whether the evidence makes a prima facie case for punitive damages”
How later courts described this case
- stating that in a jury trial on a retaliatory discharge claim the “court decides whether the evidence makes a prima facie case for punitive damages”
- jury has a unique ability to articulate community values in evaluating the reprehensibility of a defendant’s conduct for purposes of awarding punitive damages
- “types of conduct qualifying for admission as a routine business practice are ministerial [not discretionary] acts: mailing, filing, sending notice, and the like”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, specially concurring:
I concur in the results reached by my colleagues but wish to make further comment in regard to section II dealing with instructing the jury on punitive damages.
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 172 , 384 N.E.2d 353 , does not mandate a punitive damages instruction to the jury in every retaliatory discharge action. The clear import of Kelsay, however, is that without a punitive damages component in the retaliatory discharge cause of action, the action itself could very well become a tiger without teeth. Our supreme court in Kelsay stated the following:
“In the absence of the deterrent effect of punitive damages there would be little to dissuade an employer from engaging in the practice of discharging an employee for filing a workmen’s compensation claim. For example in this case, the plaintiff was entitled to only $749 compensatory damages. We noted above the very real possibility that some employers would risk the threat of criminal sanction in order to escape their responsibilities under the Act. The statute makes such conduct, as is involved in this case, a petty offense (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 48, par. 138.26), which is punishable by a fine not to exceed $500 (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1975, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 9—1(4)). The imposition on the employer of the small additional obligation to pay a wrongfully discharged employee compensation would do little to discourage the practice of retaliatory discharge, which mocks the public policy of this State as announced in the Workmen’s Compensation Act [(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 48, par. 138.1 et seq.)]. In the absence of other effective means of deterrence, punitive damages must be permitted to prevent the discharging of employees for filing workmen’s compensation claims.” ( 74 Ill. 2d at 186-87 , 384 N.E.2d at 359 .)
I interpret Kelsay, and especially the paragraph quoted above, as evidencing a strong policy statement made by our supreme court in favor of inclusion of punitive damages as part of the standard retaliatory discharge case. While neither Kelsay nor any subsequent authority cited to this court mandates charging the jury with a punitive damages instruction, I interpret the clear implication of Kelsay to be that the circuit and appellate courts and the courts of review should keep in mind that without a punitive damages component a retaliatory discharge cause of action would be an action without practical consequences or deterrence effect in regard to the practice of retaliatory discharge, which “mocks the public policy of this State.”
With these additional comments, I concur with my colleagues in the disposition of the issues noted in section II of the opinion and with the rest of this opinion.