finding that retroactive application of its decision was appropriate because the statutory language of the statute interpreted by the decision foreshadowed its interpretation; therefore, the decision did not announce a new principle of law
How later courts described this case
- finding that retroactive application of its decision was appropriate because the statutory language of the statute interpreted by the decision foreshadowed its interpretation; therefore, the decision did not announce a new principle of law
- Heiple, J., also specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., concurring and joining in Justice Heiple’s special concurrence on this point
- Heiple, J., specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., specially concurring and joining in Justice Heiple’s special concurrence on this point
- Heiple, J., specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., also specially concurring and joining in Justice Heiple's special concurrence on this point
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Doe v. HINSDALE TWP. HIGH SCHOOL DIST. 86, 905 N.E.2d 343 (2009)
In so ruling, we reject the defendants' reliance on Paszkowski, Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill.2d 304, 269 Ill.Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660 (2001), and Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill.2d 186, 242 Ill.Dec. 120, 720 N.E.2d 1075 (1999).
Distinguished by Doe v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86, 388 Ill. App. 3d 995 (2009)
In so ruling, we reject the defendants’ reliance on Paszkowski, Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304 (2001), and Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186 (1999).
Distinguished by Paszkowski v. METROPOLITAN WATER REC. DIST., 338 Ill. App. 3d 781 (2003)
In our view, however, Tosado is distinguishable from this case and, consequently, distinguishable from Greb.
The opinion
JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting:
Contrary to the plurality, I believe that Lanxon v. Magnus, 296 Ill. App. 3d 377 (3rd Dist. 1998), Cleaver v. Marrese, 253 Ill. App. 3d 778 (5th Dist. 1993), and Murray v. Sheahan, 991 F. Supp. 1052 (N.D. Ill. 1998), were correctly decided. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ medical malpractice actions should be governed by the two-year limitations period for medical malpractice actions set forth in the Code of Civil Procedure rather than the generic one-year limitations period set forth in the Tort Immunity Act. Because plaintiffs filed their complaints within the applicable two-year limitations period, defendants’ motions to dismiss were properly denied, and the judgment of the appellate court should be reversed.