finding that retroactive application of its decision was appropriate because the statutory language of the statute interpreted by the decision foreshadowed its interpretation; therefore, the decision did not announce a new principle of law
How later courts described this case
- finding that retroactive application of its decision was appropriate because the statutory language of the statute interpreted by the decision foreshadowed its interpretation; therefore, the decision did not announce a new principle of law
- Heiple, J., also specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., concurring and joining in Justice Heiple’s special concurrence on this point
- Heiple, J., specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., specially concurring and joining in Justice Heiple’s special concurrence on this point
- Heiple, J., specially concurring; Freeman, C.J., also specially concurring and joining in Justice Heiple's special concurrence on this point
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Doe v. HINSDALE TWP. HIGH SCHOOL DIST. 86, 905 N.E.2d 343 (2009)
In so ruling, we reject the defendants' reliance on Paszkowski, Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill.2d 304, 269 Ill.Dec. 188, 780 N.E.2d 660 (2001), and Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill.2d 186, 242 Ill.Dec. 120, 720 N.E.2d 1075 (1999).
Distinguished by Doe v. Hinsdale Township High School District 86, 388 Ill. App. 3d 995 (2009)
In so ruling, we reject the defendants’ reliance on Paszkowski, Ferguson v. McKenzie, 202 Ill. 2d 304 (2001), and Tosado v. Miller, 188 Ill. 2d 186 (1999).
Distinguished by Paszkowski v. METROPOLITAN WATER REC. DIST., 338 Ill. App. 3d 781 (2003)
In our view, however, Tosado is distinguishable from this case and, consequently, distinguishable from Greb.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE FREEMAN, specially concurring;
I agree with the plurality to the extent that it holds that the one-year statute of limitation contained in section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act (745 ILCS 10/8— 101 (West 1996)) applies to the causes of action at issue in this case. I also believe, like the plurality, that the policy considerations presented in this appeal are questions that are more appropriately left to our General Assembly. 188 Ill. 2d at 196. Nevertheless, I agree with Justice Heiple that plaintiffs “make a plausible case that the focus [in this appeal] should be on the type of the cause of action, not on the nature of the defendants.” See 188 Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring). Therefore, I join in Justice Heiple’s special concurrence to the extent that “this is one of those instances where ‘the legislature intended to make the general act controlling’ ” and that section 8 — 101 of the Tort Immunity Act was designed to apply broadly to any possible claim against a local governmental entity and its employees. 188 Ill. 2d at 199 (Heiple, J., specially concurring), quoting Stone v. Department of Employment Security Board of Review, 151 Ill. 2d 257, 266 (1992). However, I do not join in, nor do I condone, Justice Heiple’s characterization of the dissent submitted in this matter by Justice McMorrow.