respondent did not disclose debtor-creditor relationship he had with Holzer to opposing counsel
How later courts described this case
- respondent did not disclose debtor-creditor relationship he had with Holzer to opposing counsel
- attorney’s intent was not to influence the judge
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE MORAN, dissenting:
I believe that the Administrator has failed to present clear and convincing evidence of any professional misconduct on respondent’s part. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
It is well established that, in disciplinary proceedings, an attorney is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden of proof rests with those making the charges. (In re Serritella (1955), 5 Ill. 2d 392, 396-97 .) Thus, the Administrator must prove allegations of misconduct by clear and convincing evidence. In re Woldman (1983), 98 Ill. 2d 248, 254 .
The Administrator’s case against respondent rests almost entirely upon the circumstances surrounding the loan, with the Administrator characterizing the manner of the payment as “suspicious.” Yet, while the circumstances surrounding the transaction may arouse suspicion, it is well settled that suspicious circumstances, standing alone, are not sufficient to warrant discipline. In re Amaden (1942), 380 Ill. 545, 552 .
The Administrator urges that the “suspicious” manner in which the loan was given indicates that the loan was not for campaign purposes. However, in its findings, the Hearing Board determined that from its inception, respondent’s loan to Holzer was meant for campaign purposes and that no one had refuted respondent on this issue. The Hearing Board further determined that “[t]he manner in which the loan was made is of no moment.” Based on these determinations, the Hearing Board unanimously concluded that the loan was intended as a campaign loan and recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
The Hearing Board’s findings “are entitled to virtually the same weight as the findings of any initial trier of facts in our judicial system.” In re Bossov (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 439, 441 ; see also In re Hopper (1981), 85 Ill. 2d 318, 323 (“the hearing panel’s finding is entitled to great weight when the panel is acting as the trier of fact”).
While this is an admittedly close case, as evidenced by the contrary rulings of the Hearing Board and the Review Board, I believe that we must defer to the findings of the Hearing Board.
While the transaction in question may be criticized for both the manner and method in which it occurred, I believe that, when all the facts and circumstances are considered, the proof is not of the convincing character essential to a finding that respondent should be sanctioned. Accordingly, I believe that the complaint should be dismissed and respondent should be discharged.