holding that police officers in pursuit of an underage driver who was operating a car recklessly were immune from liability for injuries caused to the driver’s innocent passengers as the proximate cause of those injuries was not the officers’ decision to chase the driver, but rather the reckless conduct of the fleeing driver
How later courts described this case
- holding that police officers in pursuit of an underage driver who was operating a car recklessly were immune from liability for injuries caused to the driver’s innocent passengers as the proximate cause of those injuries was not the officers’ decision to chase the driver, but rather the reckless conduct of the fleeing driver
- explaining that, before this Court overrules *286 a precedent it deems “wrongly decided,” it “should also review whether the decision at issue defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision”
- explaining that, before this Court overrules a precedent it deems “wrongly decided,” it “should also review whether the decision at issue defies ‘practical workability,’ whether reliance interests would work an undue hardship, and whether changes in the law or facts no longer justify the questioned decision”
- recognizing that "[i]t is appropriate to consult a lay dictionary when defining common words or phrases that have not acquired a unique meaning at law because 'the common and approved usage of a nonlegal term is most likely to be found in a standard dictionary and not a legal dictionary' "
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*493 Cavanagh, J.
{dissenting). I concur with Justice Kelly’s dissent in its entirety. However, the majority having taken the opportunity, quite properly, to respond to the dissent, I offer a few brief words of my own in response to the wonderfully defensive concurrence. The concurrence’s uncontrolled compulsion to respond to a 1999 statement, and its efforts to reargue the merits of decided cases evidence its perceived shortcomings of the rationale already provided by the majority in these cases. Despite the concurrence’s proclamations about the importance of legitimacy and continuity in the law, the concurrence fails to adequately justify this Court’s recent routine practice of ignoring precedent and overruling our cases.
I cannot disagree more with the concurrence that today’s decision “restores judicial legitimacy by overruling decisions that wrongly usurped the power of the Legislature.” Ante at 474. To suggest that legitimacy has been restored is to suggest that legitimacy had been lost. One need only review the decisions cast aside by today’s decision in order to discover that they were firmly rooted in the law.
Although the concurrence provides an explanation for the Court’s recent track record, it provides no justification. I take comfort in the fact that anyone who reads the concurrence with a critical eye will be led back to the cases cited. The criticisms of the majority opinions in the cited cases will not soon be erased. 1
*494 It is unclear exactly how the concurring opinion relates to the merits of the present cases. Rather, the concurrence latches onto a new discussion as a means for rehashing a tangential debate. Yet, paranoia about how a prior debate has been viewed is not a sufficient basis for injecting that former debate into a subsequent phase of this case. Although I could offer further explanations for my dissenting statement from the resubmission order in this case, 461 Mich 1201 -1204 (1999), I disagree that this is the time to debate a dissent that focused on whether this Court should manufacture issues to be briefed. Rather, this is the time to decide the issues argued. Thankfully, the majority and dissent have done so.
For an explanation on the merits, see the dissenting opinions in McDougall v Schanz/Sobran v McKendrick, 461 Mich 15, 38 ; 597 NW2d 148 (1999) (pointing out an unconstitutional legislative usurpation of judicial power); People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484, 504 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999) (arguing that People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170 ; 577 NW2d 422 [1998], rather than the majority opinion, was true to MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096). In People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411 ; 605 NW2d 667 (2000), the dissent pro *494 vides an explanation why People v Taylor, 454 Mich 580 ; 564 NW2d 24 (1997), was not “fundamentally flawed” as the concurrence asserts. Ante at 472. The Kazm/ierczak dissent amply explained why Taylor could be applied, and cautioned against overruling precedent unnecessarily.