Robinson v. City of Detroit

Corrigan, J.

I concur with the majority opinion in all respects! I write separately to respond to the dis *470 sent’s claim that this Court’s recent decisions reflect a “casual disregard” for precedent. 1

This Court has displayed a proper respect for judicial restraint while discharging its weighty responsibility to the people of Michigan to uphold the constitution and laws. The rule of stare decisis is not an *471 inexorable command. People v Graves, 458 Mich 476, 481 ; 581 NW2d 229 (1998). As the highest Court in this state, our responsibility is not limited to deciding issues of first impression. We need not simply render decisions and close our eyes to their ramifications. 2 Wilson v Doehler-Jarvis, 358 Mich 510, 514 ; 100 NW2d 226 (1960). Would those who equate activism with a willingness to correct error favor a body of law totally insulated from change? Or does the “judicial activist” label only attach to those who correct erroneous decisions that do not comport with the accuser’s policy preference, whatever that policy may be?

hi my experience, the justices of this Court struggle diligently to render principled decisions. The justices are not, however, infallible. Subsequent events and further reflection frequently reveal errors in the reasoning of an opinion or unforeseen consequences. In such cases, our responsibility demands that we reconsider the prior decision. See Wilson, supra at 514 . “When it becomes apparent that the reasoning of an opinion is erroneous, and that less mischief will result from overruling the case rather than following it, it *472 becomes the duty of the court to correct it.” Graves, supra at 481 .

This Court has fulfilled its duty. In People v Kazmierczak, 461 Mich 411 ; 605 NW2d 667 (2000), for example, we overruled People v Taylor, 454 Mich 580 ; 564 NW2d 24 (1997), because Taylor misread and misapplied controlling United States Supreme Court Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Taylor “confused the concept of probable cause and how it may be shown with the concept of search warrant exceptions and when they exist.” Kazmierczak, supra at 420 . To allow that fundamentally flawed two-year-old decision to stand would have violated the public interest because lower courts would have been compelled to dismiss legitimate criminal charges on the basis of a misapplication of United States Supreme Court precedent in the Taylor case.

Similarly, in People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), we overruled People v Gearns, 457 Mich 170 ; 577 NW2d 422 (1998), because the Gearns test for harmless error clearly conflicted with MCL 769.26; MSA 28.1096. We acknowledged and corrected the clear error in Gearns because the statute controls judicial review of preserved, nonconstitutional error. Lukity, supra at 495 . To allow Gearns to stand would have violated the public interest because it would have resulted in the reversal of valid criminal convictions in contravention of legislative policy.

Our decisions since January 1999 reflect our adherence to our respective oaths to support the constitution and faithfully discharge the duties of our office. Const 1963, art 11, § 1. To preserve the legitimacy of the judicial branch, this Court must not exceed the limits of its constitutional authority. I agree that too *473 rapid change in the law threatens judicial legitimacy, as it threatens the stability of any institution. But the act of correcting past rulings that usurp power properly belonging to the legislative branch does not threaten legitimacy. Rather, it restores legitimacy. Simply put, our duty to act within our constitutional grant of authority is paramount. If a prior decision of this Court reflects an abuse of judicial power at the expense of legislative authority, a failure to recognize and correct that excess, even if done in the name of stare decisis, would perpetuate an unacceptable abuse of judicial power.

In McDougall v Schanz/Sobran v McKendrick, 461 Mich 15 ; 597 NW2d 148 (1999), for instance, we were required to recognize the limits of our constitutional authority. Our prior decisions had “failed to consider the constitutionally required distinction between ‘practice and procedure’ and substantive law and thus overstated the reach of our rule-making authority.” Id. at 29 . Our duty to adhere to the constitution compelled us to reject our prior characterization of all statutes that resemble rules of evidence as relating solely to practice and procedure in favor of an analysis that distinguishes between procedural rules of evidence and evidentiary rules of substantive law. Id. at 30-31 . We could not follow past precedent when to do so would exceed the scope of this Court’s constitutional authority.

The present case likewise requires that we respect the constitutional division of powers between the Legislature and the judiciary. This Court has the authority to construe statutes, not to redraft them. This task can be difficult because the Legislature sometimes uses language that is reasonably suscepti *474 ble to more than one meaning. This Court properly exercises its constitutional authority in construing such ambiguous statutes in light of their language and legislative purpose. When, however, under the guise of statutory construction, this Court ignores the language of the statute to further its own policy views, it wrongly usurps the power of the Legislature.

In her dissent in Dedes v Asch, 446 Mich 99, 123-124 ; 521 NW2d 488 (1994), Justice Riley explained that this Court exceeds the limit of its constitutional authority when it substitutes its policy choice for that of the Legislature:

If the Legislature acted unwisely in enacting the statute or failing to adequately debate its merits, the judiciary may not act to save the Legislature from its folly. As long as they do not violate the constitution, legislative controversies are to be resolved by the various democratic safeguards and checks in the constitution: ballot box, initiative, referendum, or constitutional amendment. The majority, however, stifles and denigrates these processes by reaching beyond the plain language of the act and crafting a new statute reflective of its sensibilities.

In my view, our decision today restores judicial legitimacy by overruling decisions that wrongly usurped the power of the Legislature.

The dissent builds on a theme first expressed in this case in Justice Cavanagh’s statement dissenting from the resubmission order. 461 Mich 1201 -1204 (1999). He suggested that the actions of “the majority” evidenced a lack of judicial restraint. In support of this position, he identified six opinions in which this Court allegedly disregarded the principle of stare decisis: Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, 461 Mich 73 ; 597 NW2d 517 (1999), McDougall v Schanz/Sobran v McKendrick, 461 Mich 15 ; 597 NW2d 148 (1999), People v Carines, 460 Mich 750 ; 597 NW2d 130 (1999), People v Lukity, 460 Mich 484 ; 596 NW2d 607 (1999), People v Borchard-Ruhland, 460 Mich 278 ; 597 NW2d 1 (1999), and McCready v Hoffius, 459 Mich 1235 (1999). The claims that the majority lacks respect for the doctrine of stare decisis are ill-founded and cannot withstand scrutiny.

In his dissenting statement, Justice Cavanagh used former Justice Brickley, the senior member of the Court at that time, as a barometer of principled decision making. In his words, Justice Brickley brought to the cases “unwavering objectivity and reason, unconstrained by any predetermined notions.” 461 Mich 1204, n 4 . After distinguishing Justice Brickley in this manner, Justice Cavanagh noted that Justice Brickley had joined “a few” of the opinions cited as examples of “the majority’s” lack of restraint. In fact, Justice Brickley actually joined the majority opinion in five of the six cases cited and concurred in the result in the sixth. Lukity, supra at 503 (Brickley, J., concurring) (“I concur in the majority opinion, and write separately to acknowledge its discussion of the proper standard for reviewing whether error is harmless”); McDougall, supra at 37 ; Carines, supra at 773 ; Borchard-Ruhland, supra at 295 ; McCready, supra at 1235-1236 ; Ritchie-Gamester, supra at 95 (Brickley, J., concurring). Justice Brickley’s actual voting record undermines the veiled suggestion that a new group of intemperate justices seized control of this Court after the “ascendancy” of “the majority” on January 1, 1999. 461 Mich 1203 .

Further, it is clear that the principle of stare decisis is inapplicable in three of the six cases alleged to violate stare decisis. In Corines, supra, we declined to follow People v Vaughn, 447 Mich 217 ; 524 NW2d 217 (1994), a plurality opinion that had no precedential force, in Borchard-Ruhland, supra, we declined to follow dicta in an earlier case, and in McCready, supra, in lieu of granting rehearing we remanded for further argument of a constitutional issue that was not addressed in the lower courts. It is axiomatic that principles of stare decisis do not apply to plurality opinions, dicta from previous cases, or to cases considered anew on motions for rehearing.

This willingness to reexamine precedent is actually an important component of the development of the common law. The common law is not immutable; rather, it is flexible and adaptable to changing conditions. Bugbee v Fowle, 277 Mich 485, 492 ; 269 NW 570 (1936). “[C]hanging conditions may give rise to new rights under the law, and, also, where the reason on which existing rules of the common law are founded ceases, the rules may cease to have application.” Beech Grove Investment Co v Civil Rights Comm, 380 Mich 405, 430 ; 157 NW2d 213 (1968) (plurality opinion), quoting 15A CJS, Common Law, § 2, pp 43-44. In Ritchie-Gamester v City of Berkley, n 1 supra, we exercised our authority over the development of the common law and adopted reckless misconduct as the minimum standard of care for coparticipants in recreational activities.