“A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally unacceptable.”
How later courts described this case
- “A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally unacceptable.”
- “A map that is politically unacceptable to one political party is not, for that reason, legally *33 unacceptable.”
- January 14 opinion explaining January 10 ruling
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, concurring:
I concur in the judgment of the court but for reasons different from those expressed by the majority.
As the majority opinion observes, the Legislative Redistricting Commission has fully complied with the mandate contained in this court’s opinion of December 13, 1991. Following the parties’ submission of two new redistricting maps, the Commission conducted extensive evidentiary hearings on those proposals, as amended, and addressed the concerns previously raised by this court. At the conclusion of the hearings, the Commission adopted a new statewide redistricting plan, Jourdan III-A.
I note, at the outset, that we are not being called upon in the present case to judge either the wisdom or the validity of the procedures mandated by the Illinois Constitution for formation of the Commission (see Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b)). Significantly, the parties have not questioned the constitutionality of the method used to select the Commission’s ninth member. Nor has any member of this court seen fit to raise the issue sua sponte at any earlier point in these proceedings. In any event, I believe that a due process challenge to the tie-breaking procedure would fail. In People ex rel. Scott v. Grivetti (1971), 50 Ill. 2d 156 , this court upheld, against constitutional attack on first amendment and equal protection grounds, the general scheme prescribed for the selection of the Commission members. Although a due process challenge to the tie-breaking procedure was not raised in that case, I believe that this new argument would fail as well.
As framed by the court’s earlier mandate in this case, our task now is simply to review the statewide redistricting plan adopted by the Commission and determine whether it satisfies the criteria by which such plans must be measured. The record before us demonstrates that the Jourdan III-A plan fully meets all relevant constitutional and statutory redistricting requirements and, moreover, is superior in these respects to the plan submitted by certain intervenors, CIP II-A. The legislative and representative districts drawn by Jourdan III-A are substantially equal in population, are sufficiently compact, are fair to minorities, and are fair to both major political parties. In virtually all respects, too, the districts contained in the Jourdan III-A plan more closely meet these requirements than do the districts found in the intervenors’ proposed map. Thus, unlike the majority, I would uphold the plan adopted by the Commission — not because we lack the time, staff, or resources to draw a better map ourselves, as the majority opinion suggests, but because the Commission’s plan satisfies all applicable requirements and is superior to the one submitted by certain intervenors.
For these reasons, I concur in the judgment of the court adopting the Jourdan III-A statewide redistricting plan.