People Ex Rel. Burris v. Ryan

CHIEF JUSTICE MILLER, dissenting:

Unlike the majority, I would consider now, without any further delay, the merits of the Commission’s redistricting plan. Today’s decision unnecessarily postpones our resolution of the important issues presented by this case, jeopardizing the timely adoption of a constitutional map — one that accurately reflects the substantial shifts in population that have occurred in Illinois since the last decennial census.

Before this court, the plaintiffs raise a number of important issues concerning the redistricting plan adopted by the Commission. The plaintiffs argue, as a preliminary matter, that the procedures leading up to the adoption of the plan were fatally flawed. In addition, the plaintiffs challenge the Commission plan on a variety of substantive constitutional and statutory grounds. In this regard, the plaintiffs contend that certain specified districts in the plan violate the rights of women, violate the rights of minorities, are the result of political gerrymandering, and are insufficiently compact. The majority opinion resolves only peripheral questions — and those incorrectly — and fails entirely to provide the parties with any decision, or meaningful guidance, on the substantive issues before the court. Although the majority invites the parties to submit additional redistricting plans, the' majority neglects to explain what criteria will eventually control our acceptance or rejection of those maps, which later may very well be challenged on the same grounds raised here.

The majority concludes that the present record does not afford us a sufficient evidentiary basis on which to resolve the plaintiffs’ various challenges. The majority believes that the defects it finds in the record may be attributed to the Commission’s failure to conduct, any fact-finding hearings on the Jourdan II Plan, which the Commission ultimately adopted. The majority further declares that, in the absence of a hearing, this court can neither approve nor disapprove the adopted plan, no matter how fair, compact, or contiguous its districts might be. There is, however, no requirement that the Commission hold such hearings on the proposals before it; even if such a requirement existed, I could not agree with the majority’s suggestion that the Commission’s failure to conduct a public hearing on the plan would necessitate our rejection of it.

There is no requirement, constitutional or otherwise, that fact-finding hearings be conducted by the Commission. Neither the constitutional drafters nor the persons present at this Commission’s creation believed that fact-finding hearings would be necessary for the complete performance by the Commissioners of their duties. The detailed provisions contained in section 3 of the legislative article, which govern the operations of the Commission, contain no requirement that the Commission hold hearings on the redistricting proposals before it. (See Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3.) Moreover, the Commission’s own rules, which the eight original members adopted unanimously, do not require the holding of fact-finding hearings on redistricting proposals. Although the Commission’s failure to hold a public hearing on the plan it adopted might conceivably cause us to scrutinize more closely that plan and the data offered in support of it, the absence of such public input should not automatically render the plan invalid, regardless of its merits. See Karcher v. Daggett (1983), 462 U.S. 725, 759 , 77 L. Ed. 2d 133, 160 , 103 S. Ct. 2653, 2674 (Stevens, J., concurring).

In any event, the record of the Commission’s proceedings is far from barren. The Jourdan II Plan represented the culmination of the redistricting process; it was produced following the presentation of the Jourdan I Plan and the receipt of commentary on that earlier proposal. Thus, it is difficult to understand the majority’s apparent pique with the parties’ submission of their final proposals near the end of the Commission proceedings. The Commission had before it a broad range of information that it could use in developing a redistricting map. Numerous persons testified at the Commission’s public hearings. These witnesses, who came from urban and rural areas throughout the State, not only commented on the relative merits and demerits of other specific redistricting proposals, but also provided general testimony on the needs and interests of the communities they represented. Other persons, too, representing a broad range of views, were consulted by the principal drafters of the Jourdan II Plan. Apart from these sources of information, the Commission also had available to it the extensive record made by the legislature itself during its own consideration of the matter, including the data and testimony compiled during that stage of the process. As demonstrated by the affidavits submitted by the parties, all this testimony, census data, and other information were considered in the formulation of the Commission’s plan. And all of this information is included in the record before us.

Determining nonetheless that the present record requires supplementation, the majority remands the matter to the Commission for further proceedings and invites the parties to submit additional maps. Also, the majority opinion summarily concludes, without analysis, that certain districts contained in the Jourdan II Plan appear to violate constitutional requirements concerning compactness and racial dilution, and the majority directs the Commission to consider these objections further.

As I have noted, however, the majority’s decision resolves none of the substantive issues now before us, and the parties are left without any meaningful guidance on the substantive legal principles that frame the plaintiffs’ challenges. Thus, it is simply not clear why the majority believes that certain districts are not compact while others are. Nor is it clear why other districts both lack compactness and implicate concerns of racial dilution, or why still other districts implicate only concerns of racial dilution.

The majority opinion does not explain the grounds for its apparent rejection of these districts, and the opinion fails entirely to resolve the different legal issues raised by the parties in connection with these specific challenges. And in directing the Commission to consider these objections to particular districts in the new proceeding, the court inexplicably includes in its lists certain districts that are not challenged at all, by any party. If the majority is in fact concerned about districts that until now have gone unchallenged, or that should be challenged on grounds different from those raised by the parties, then the majority should at least make that clear. In any case, I do not see what can be gained from the majority’s request to the Commission that it resolve the constitutional questions that should be answered by this court.

Contrary to the majority’s view, I believe that the plaintiffs’ substantive and procedural challenges to the Commission’s plan may be determined at this time, on the basis of the information now before this court. The parties have submitted extensive briefs and supporting documentation on these various issues. Indeed, the record before us appears to be as complete as the one presented to the three-judge panel in Hastert v. State Board of Elections (N.D. Ill. 1991), 777 F. Supp. 634 , which the majority initially refuses to adopt but then later endorses as a model. If in fact the record in this case is incomplete and we lack certain data or other information necessary for the resolution of these questions, as the majority suggests, but that I do not believe, then we should enter an appropriate order and direct the parties to supply the absent evidence on an expedited basis.

By remanding the present matter to the Commission without analyzing any of the substantive or procedural issues raised by the parties, the court is postponing, if not abdicating, the performance of its constitutionally mandated duty to determine the validity of the redistricting plan adopted by the Commission. In addition, the majority’s decision severely limits the possibility that the parties might reach a compromise and settle on a valid map that is acceptable to all. Determining the merits of the plaintiffs’ underlying claims, and not just the specific challenges to certain districts, would at least enable the parties to proceed in their mapmaking with some guidance on the applicable principles of law. Little can be gained, through the majority’s procedure, except to put off to another day this court’s resolution of the issues presented here, a determination the majority has intimated it might escape by calling for an at-large election if no satisfactory plan is proposed. Although the parties have not addressed the prospect of an at-large election, that procedure itself might implicate the Federal Voting Rights Act, which influenced the drawing of many of the districts complained of here.

We have before us a full and complete record on which to decide the present matter. Rather than delay further the resolution of this controversy, I would consider now the various substantive and procedural issues raised by the plaintiffs in their challenges to the Commission’s redistricting plan. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.

Opinion filed January 14, 1992.

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court:

As stated in the order of this court dated January 10, 1992, the Legislative Redistricting Commission (the Commission) has complied with the procedural and substantive directives of our December 13, 1991, opinion, and article IV, section 3, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970.

Following the December 13, 1991, opinion, the Commission held expedited hearings on January 4 and 5, 1992. At that time, the Commission heard testimony by experts on behalf of the parties, and reviewed affidavits filed on behalf of the parties, as well as voluminous documents, including those documents submitted by the main intervenors. The Commission focused the hearing on two plans, Certain Intervenors’ Proposed Remedial Redistricting Plan (CIP II-A), and the Commission’s plan, Jour dan III-A.

Before addressing either of the proposed plans, we must make certain findings in light of the extraordinary circumstances of the case at hand with the hope that this situation will not again be before this court and place in jeopardy the voting rights of the people of this State. Throughout the process, we noted the troubled winds that have unfailingly roared through the legislature, the Commission and the media; needless to say, these criticisms do have bearing, adverse at best, on any plan this court may adopt or fashion. However, time, staff and budget demands do not permit this court to fashion its own redistricting plan that meets all of the objectives, no matter how desirable. The most important consideration, and the underlying thrust of this opinion, is the interest of the voters of this State. The interest of the voters mandates holding elections on time. It is that consideration and the lack of sufficient budget and time which prevents this court from competently drawing a map that would take into account the diverse interests at stake in this litigation. We are more concerned with the prospect of denying the voters the right to choose the representative of their choice and of denying equality in voting, i.e., one man, one vote.

It is also of the utmost importance for all parties involved to understand that the necessity of compromise is essential to any politically fair redistricting plan. Too many interests exist in this matter, both represented and unrepresented, to keep clearly in mind. Furthermore, as the population increases and changes, the need to compromise becomes an integral part of the goal to protect the rights of the voters. This is a country which believes everyone has a fair chance. Those democratic values, so firmly entrenched in this country, make compromise essential. In our view, that element of compromise is profoundly lacking in this matter. Furthermore, the parties must understand that by adoption of the Commission plan, this court in no way has expressed an overwhelming acceptance of the plan of the Commission. The holding of this court has been made with the best interests of the voters in mind.

The tortuous process which we have just experienced is not in the best interests of the voters of this State. The legislature has eight years, if it is sincere, to correct this process in order that the voters with special interests will have an opportunity to participate in the election process. After all of the deliberation and expense to the taxpayers, over $2 million, we do not find that a lottery or a flip of a coin is in the best interests of anyone except the party which has won the toss. The rights of the voters should not be part of a game of chance. The consequences of such a method affect everyone.

We further conclude that any order of this court issued after January 19, 1992, would be too late to establish proper election procedures. An order issued after this date would not give candidates enough time to decide whether to run. Nor would it give those involved in the election process time to prepare. Most importantly, it would not give voters adequate opportunity to familiarize themselves with their districts and their candidates. If elections are to be timely held, they must be held pursuant to existing law. We find it preferable to hold elections on the date already established for State elections. Conducting special elections would result in lower voter turnout and place extraordinary expenses on the State at a time when this court takes judicial notice of extreme budgetary constraints.

In light of our overwhelming concern for the voting rights of the people of this State, we cannot, in good conscience, order an at-large election which would place a heavy burden on the budget of this State and place tight time constraints on the proper functioning of the State Board of Elections. The above considerations have made this court reach its conclusion. It is well established that the map submitted by the constitutionally mandated Commission is valid unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. IV, §3(b).) Thus, the parties opposing the map must establish that not only their map or maps are superior, but that the Commission map is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

In testing each map submitted, the court viewed each map with these issues in mind:

(1) whether the plan satisfies the Illinois constitutional requirement of substantially equal population in each district;

(2) whether the map has provided adequate representation to minorities and other special interests to satisfy various State and United States constitutional rights as well as Federal statutes, i.e., racial, ethnic and gender;

(3) whether the maps satisfy the compactness requirements of the Illinois Constitution; and

(4) whether the maps meet all legal requirements regarding political fairness.

Based on the testimony of the expert witnesses and the negative responses to both plans, the adoption by this court of one of the plans submitted by either party would actually be a reflection on legislative policy choices. After reviewing all of the evidence submitted, this court finds that both plans are similar regarding compactness. However, the Commission map meets all four requirements. In finding thus, we did not judge the credibility of each expert, but rather relied on the statistics provided.

For the reasons stated, we hold that the Jourdan III-A map is valid. It is the order of this court that the State Board of Elections establish the boundaries in accordance with the Jourdan III-A map. On order of this court, the clerk of this court is directed to issue the mandate forthwith.

Map approved.