deciding a case mirroring the facts here, where the court found a limited immunity statute barred claims of negligent supervision against teachers, but did not bar premises liability claims against the school district
How later courts described this case
- deciding a case mirroring the facts here, where the court found a limited immunity statute barred claims of negligent supervision against teachers, but did not bar premises liability claims against the school district
- a complaint alleging the independent negligence of a school district in maintaining its premises is not barred by sections 24–24 or 34–84a of the School Code
- “[a]s in any employment situation, school districts vicariously benefit from a teacher’s immunity when a cause of action against the school district is predicated on the negligence of a teacher”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE HEIPLE, dissenting:
The dispute in this case concerns whether a school district is liable for an injury occurring to a student on a school playground resulting from the school district’s negligence. The case is before us on a motion to dismiss the complaint, which was granted by the trial court and reversed by the appellate court. The majority opinion affirms the judgment of the appellate court and remands for further proceedings. The gist of the claim is that the student plaintiff was participating in a physical education class on a school playground when he fell and hurt himself due to a rut in the ground. The complaint alleged that the school district was negligent because it allowed the rut to continue to form and deepen in the playground, and because the school district failed to fill in the rut to make the playground level. In addressing the school district’s liability, the majority limits its inquiry to the School Code of Illinois. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 122, pars. 24—24, 34—84a.) These sections of the School Code provide immunity to teachers and other certificated educational employees, but do not give immunity to school districts unless the cause of action against the school district is predicated upon the negligence of a teacher. While I have no dispute with the majority’s interpretation of the scope of immunity provided by sections 24—24 and 34—84a of the School Code of Illinois, I am concerned that the majority failed to address the scope of immunity provided under section 3—106 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 85, par. 3—106).
The Tort Immunity Act provides public entities with immunity from liability for injuries occurring on playgrounds due to negligence (willful and wanton misconduct excepted). Since the amended complaint alleges mere negligence and not willful and wanton misconduct on the part of the school district, the Tort Immunity Act grants the school district immunity in the instant case. Jackson v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 716 .
In declining to address this issue, the majority apparently relies upon that ancient procedural precept that an issue not previously raised cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Though that precept is valid, it is subject to a reasonable exception. The exception is that when the record contains all the factual material necessary to decide an issue, the reviewing court will consider the issue even though it was not previously raised below. (Bell v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. (1985), 106 Ill. 2d 135, 141-42 .) Since the facts necessary to decide this issue are before us, it should be addressed at this juncture.
The majority opinion disposes of the defense raised under the School Code and remands the cause for further proceedings without answering a controlling question of law. That is to say, without commenting on the immunity furnished by the Tort Immunity Act. In the interest of judicial economy, the opinion in this case should indicate that the Tort Immunity Act effectively forecloses the plaintiff’s claim and that, accordingly, the cause should be ordered dismissed.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the decision of the court.