stating better-law factor unnecessary when other factors resolve choice of law
How later courts described this case
- stating better-law factor unnecessary when other factors resolve choice of law
- since New York law on defamation was unclear, the Court concluded that the judicial task would be made simpler if the Court applied Minnesota law
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
DAVIES, Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent for two reasons.
*244 First, it would be advisable to read Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 , 94 S.Ct. 2997 , 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974), as prohibiting the use of the doctrine of defamation per se to open the door to damages in media cases. That reading of Gertz has been applied in a number of jurisdictions and suggested by a number of commentators. See Little Rock Newspapers, Inc. v. Dodrill, 281 Ark. 25 , 660 S.W.2d 933, 936 (1983) (without a showing of either actual malice or injury to reputation, evidence insufficient to go to jury); Gobin v. Globe Pub. Co., 232 Kan. 1 , 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982) (because damage to reputation is “essence and gravamen” of defamation action, plaintiff must show injury to reputation to establish claim for defamation); Salomone v. MacMillan Pub. Co., 77 A.D.2d 501 , 429 N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (1980); France v. St. Clare’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 82 A.D.2d 1 , 441 N.Y.S.2d 79, 82 (1981). See generally Annotation, Proof of Injury to Reputation as Prerequisite to Recovery of Damages in Defamation Action—P osb-Gertz Cases, 36 A.L.R.4th 807 , 811 (1985 & Supp.1994) (noting states that require proof of harm to reputation for defamation claims). See, e.g., Joel D. Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 Va.L.Rev. 1347 (1975).
Here, the majority inadvisably relies on the doctrine of defamation per se to permit appellants to survive summary judgment. But the purpose of summary judgment is “to separate the wheat from the chaff and relieve the court system of the burden and expense of‘unfounded litigation.” Cook v. Connolly, 366 N.W.2d 287, 292 (Minn.1985).
My second reason for dissent is that, even if there is room in Minnesota law for defamation per se, the doctrine is inappropriately applied in this case. The Maury Povich show specifically identified the offenders by name, clearly establishing that they were not appellants. In the face of that identification, appellants should be required to show that someone nonetheless mistakenly understood appellants to have been the offending parties. Because appellants failed to make such a showing, per se defamation was unavailable to defeat summary judgment. Its application was inappropriate.