noting “that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on free speech rights” (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976))
How later courts described this case
- noting “that prior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on free speech rights” (citing Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976))
- holding that trial court's issuance of an injunction is state action sufficient to implicate Article I, Section 9
- "Because [the plaintiff] has the availability of a tort suit to remedy the damages incurred to its reputation as a result of the [defendants'] statements, in-junctive relief is not warranted."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ROBB, Judge,
concurring in result with separate opinion.
I respectfully concur in the result reached by the majority. The doctrine of Judmlal restraint precludes gratuitous judicial review of constitutional questions. Daugherty v. Allen, 729 N.E.2d 228, 233 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. dismissed. Pursuant to this doctrine, we should not make a constitutional determination if the case can be disposed of justly on non-constitutional grounds. Id. (citing Passwater v. Winn, 248 Ind. 404 , 229 N.E.2d 622, 623 (1967)). I therefore believe that we should determine whether the Mishlers are entitled to injunctive relief before we address their constitutional claim that the injuncetion is an impermissible prior restraint.
The grant or denial of an injunction rests within the equitable discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Indiana Port Comm'n v. Consolidated Grain and Barge, 701 N.E.2d 882, 886 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. denied. Nevertheless, the power to issue an injunction should be used sparingly, and such relief should not be granted except in rare instances in which the law and the facts are clearly in the movmg party's favor. Id.
The trial court's discretion to grant or deny a preliminary injunction is measured by several factors: 1) whether the mov-ant's remedies at law are inadequate, causing irreparable harm pending resolution of the substantive action; 2) whether the movant has demonstrated at least a reasonable likelihood of success at trial by establishing a prima facie case; 3) whether the threatened injury to the movant outweighs the potential harm the grant of the injunction would occasion upon the non-movant; and 4) whether the public interest would be disserved. Id. at 887 . If the movant fails to prove any one or more of these requirements, the trial court's grant of an injunction is an abuse of discretion. Id.
*100 The law is well settled that a party which suffers "mere economic injury" is not entitled to injunctive relief because an award of post-trial damages is sufficient to make the party whole. Id. The ability to obtain damages in the form of a money judgment for economic injury represents an adequate legal remedy. Daugherty, 729 N.E.2d at 235 . Here, if MAC proceeded to trial with a suit alleging that the Mishlers's statements were falsehoods, it would invariably seek compensation for damages sustained to ' its reputation. Damages as a result of injury to reputation are properly recoverable in a tort action. Id. Because MAC has the availability of a tort suit to remedy the damages incurred to its reputation as a result of the Mish-lers' statements, injunctive relief. is not warranted. Further, because reversal is called for under state law, I believe that we need not address the Mishlers' constitutional claim that the injunction is an impermissible prior restraint under the Indiana Constitution.