State Employee's Retirement System v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board

REGAN, J.

I concur in the result reached herein.

The opinion does find that in keeping with the statutory objective that if heart trouble either develops or manifests itself during employment the presumption that it arose out of and in the course of the employment is activated and such heart trouble so developing or manifesting itself shall not be *619 attributed to any disease existing prior to such development or manifestation. From this point the opinion announces a limitation of Turner v. Workmen’s Comp. App. Bd., 258 Cal.App.2d 442 [ 65 Cal.Rptr. 825 ], and holds that if heart trouble had both developed and manifested itself prior to the employment then the statutory presumption found in section 3212 of the Labor Code is unavailable.

In Turner, supra, the court in construing section 3212.5 of the Labor Code (containing an identical statutory presumption as found in section 3212) states (at pp. 448-450) : “Two principles guide our construction of section 3212.5 as amended. The first is the general rule that workmen’s compensation statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of awarding compensation. (Lab. Code, § 3202; Greydanus v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1965) 63 Cal.2d 490, 493 [ 47 Cal.Rptr. 384 , 407 P.2d 296 ].) Secondly, words in a statute should be given their ordinary meaning and receive sensible construction in accord with the commonly understood meaning thereof. (County of Los Angeles v. Frisbie (1942) 19 Cal.2d 634, 642 [ 122 P.2d 526 ] ; Hom v. Clark (1963) 221 Cal.App.2d 622, 638 [ 35 Cal.Rptr. 11 ].)

“Paraphased [sic] in terms of the ‘commonly understood meaning’ of the word ‘attributed’ in section 3212.5 as amended, the statute provides that a policeman’s in-service heart trouble shall in no case be ‘explained as caused or brought about by’ a preexisting disease. (See, e.g., Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1967) p. 142; italics added.) Directed by this plain language, we hold that under the 1959 amendment the statutory presumption cannot be rebutted by evidence of preexisting heart disease, as distinguished from ‘other evidence’ that the in-service heart trouble was not industrially caused.

“The manifest purpose of section 3212.5 prior to the 1959 amendment was to favor a class of public employees whose service is both vital to the public interest and hazardous to heart health. The favored class included Deputy Quick [citation] and Officer Ferris [citation], and it includes petitioner. Bach had a prior heart disease. Bach had heart trouble in service. But Deputy Quick received a partial award. Officer Ferris received a full award. If we follow respondent Board’s interpretation of section 3212.5 as amended, petitioner would take nothing.

“We are mindful of the interplay of Labor Code sections *620 4663 and 4750 in these situations, as discussed in the Quick and Ferris decisions; but we consider it unlikely that the progression of results cited above, or the disparity among such results, was intended by a legislature which provided that heart trouble, in the case of any of the three officers, was not to be ‘attributed’ to prior disease at all. We conclude, rather, that the 1959 Legislature intended to pursue the original purpose of section 3212.5, and to improve its effect upon the favored employee class, by amending it to preclude consideration of prior heart disease as a cause of in-service heart trouble, and against the presumption, in any case. ’ ’

If we are to follow Turner, supra, in which case the California Supreme Court denied a hearing, we should hold that the 1959 Legislature, by amending sections 3212 and 3212.5 of the Labor Code, has precluded the consideration of prior heart disease as a cause of in-service heart trouble to rebut the presumption in any case.