admitting letters from plaintiffs’ attorney to defendants to show ‘‘the fact of the defendants’ knowledge of the claimed effect of their operations, since that knowledge should influence their future conduct’’
How later courts described this case
- admitting letters from plaintiffs’ attorney to defendants to show ‘‘the fact of the defendants’ knowledge of the claimed effect of their operations, since that knowledge should influence their future conduct’’
- adopting strict liability for use of dynamite stating, ‘‘[a] person who uses an intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person of another to the danger of probable injury, is liable if such injury results, even though he uses all proper care’’ [emphasis added]
- extending liability for blasting to vibration damage
- strict liability ‘‘does not make the failure to use reasonable care a condition of liability’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
O’Sullivan, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result on the basis of the dogmatic proposition, with which the opinion begins its legal discussion, that “one who by exploding dynamite causes damage to another’s property through flying debris is absolutely liable for that damage irrespective of whether he was negligent. . . .” This principle makes an insurer of the blaster, and rightly so. Exner v. Sherman Power Construction Co., 54 F. 2d 510, 512 . Dynamite is an intrinsically dangerous substance. Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 60 , 118 A. 467 ; Norwalk Gaslight Co. v. Norwalk, 63 Conn. 495, 527 , 28 A. 32 . The possibility of its doing damage is great. The blaster should be subjected to absolute liability for injury to any property caused by the potentially destructive energy of a force which he has intentionally released. If I understand the opinion correctly, it makes liability absolute only when dynamite is used “in such a way as will necessarily or obvi *577 ously expose the {property] of another to the danger of probable injury.” This means, inferentially, that under circumstances which do not fall within the quoted phrase liability is conditioned on negligence. This emasculates the principle that the blaster acts at his peril. It reaches a result with which I am not in accord.