admitting letters from plaintiffs’ attorney to defendants to show ‘‘the fact of the defendants’ knowledge of the claimed effect of their operations, since that knowledge should influence their future conduct’’
How later courts described this case
- admitting letters from plaintiffs’ attorney to defendants to show ‘‘the fact of the defendants’ knowledge of the claimed effect of their operations, since that knowledge should influence their future conduct’’
- adopting strict liability for use of dynamite stating, ‘‘[a] person who uses an intrinsically dangerous means to accomplish a lawful end, in such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person of another to the danger of probable injury, is liable if such injury results, even though he uses all proper care’’ [emphasis added]
- extending liability for blasting to vibration damage
- strict liability ‘‘does not make the failure to use reasonable care a condition of liability’’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Baldwin, J.
(concurring). I concur in the result but I do not agree to the meaning given in the majority opinion for the words “in such a way as will necessarily or obviously expose the person of another to probable injury,” which appear in Worth v. Dunn, 98 Conn. 51, 59 , 118 A. 467 . The majority opinion states that these words do no more than define an intrinsically dangerous operation and that to incur liability one must use an intrinsically dangerous instrumentality in such a way that it necessarily or obviously exposes persons or property to probable injury. That connotes a degree of fault on the part of the defendant which is, at least, negligence and, probably, *576 even more than negligence. It carries with it an inference of wilful or deliberate misconduct. The majority opinion subscribes to the rule of absolute liability imposed when dynamite is exploded and hurls debris which injures persons or damages property, and we apply that rule to injury or damage caused by vibration and concussion. Absolute liability is liability without fault. If the words quoted mean what the majority claims for them, they add a needless and confusing qualification or condition. If the same rule is to apply for injury or damage caused by concussion and vibration as applies for damage caused by a direct hit, then these words in the Worth v. Dunn case mean no more than that the dynamite was used under circumstances and conditions which demonstrate to the trier that it could and did in fact cause the damage for which complaint is made.