‘It is entirely immaterial, however, whether her leaving was the result of company policy or a collective bargaining agreement.’
How later courts described this case
- ‘It is entirely immaterial, however, whether her leaving was the result of company policy or a collective bargaining agreement.’
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FOX, P. J.
I dissent.
The employee, as a member of the union, is bound by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement entered into on her behalf by her authorized representatives and which was also ratified by the membership. (Chavez v. Sargent, 52 Cal.2d 162, 197 [ 339 P.2d 801 ]; Division of Labor Enforcement v. Standard Coil etc. Co., 136 Cal.App.2d Supp. 919, 921-922 [ 288 P.2d 637 ].) By the terms of that agreement the employee, Mrs. Steffan, agreed that in the event of pregnancy she would not work “beyond the end of the fourth month.” She was then given the right to “voluntarily terminate” her employment, or, if she had been in the employ of the company *649 at least one year, she could apply for a formal leave of absence. Having worked for the company for more than a year, Mrs. Steffan applied for the leave of absence, which was granted.
Section 1256 of the Unemployment Insurance Code, at the times here material, provided that “an individual is disqualified for unemployment benefits if . . . [she] left [her] most recent work voluntarily without good cause ...” That Mrs. Steffan “left [her] most recent work” is not disputed. The decisive question is: Did she do so voluntarily ? Mrs. Steffan is deemed to have consented to the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. She then agreed to “voluntarily terminate” her employment in the event she became pregnant before she had worked for the company a year. Having worked for more than a year it was not necessary for her to “voluntarily terminate” her employment. She was then privileged to have a leave of absence and temporarily to cease working. She thus preserved her seniority rights with the company. It is difficult to see how her leaving work temporarily was any less voluntary than the termination of her employment would have been had she worked less than a year. Furthermore, having consented to the agreement, any action she later took in carrying out its terms should be considered as voluntary on her part. It therefore follows, under the terms of section 1256 as it then read, that Mrs. Steffan voluntarily left her most recent work and was not entitled to unemployment benefits. I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied June 29, 1960. Sehauer, J., did not participate therein.