finding that a prospective juror's use of phrases during voir dire, such as "I don't think" or "I don't know" is not necessarily indicative of doubt and "a venireman [is not expected] to express himself with meticulous preciseness . . ."
How later courts described this case
- finding that a prospective juror's use of phrases during voir dire, such as "I don't think" or "I don't know" is not necessarily indicative of doubt and "a venireman [is not expected] to express himself with meticulous preciseness . . ."
- concluding that the death penalty statute ensures adequate safeguards to prevent the arbitrary or capricious imposition of the penalty
- only question is whether "defendant injects into the case the name of an alibi witness" (emphasis added)
- where the State initially had brought out at trial the name of the defendant's alibi witness yet a defense witness also testified regarding defendant's alibi, the prosecutor properly commented upon defendant's failure to call the witness
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
JUSTICE SIMON, also dissenting:
I join in the dissent of Justice Goldenhersh. I also concur with Justice Clark’s well-reasoned dissatisfaction with the faulty instruction and the photographic-identification procedures. For the reasons so logically and convincingly advanced by Justice Goldenhersh, my view is that the conviction cannot stand. It should be reversed, and the defendant should receive a new trial.