stating that "[w]hen the object of a conspiracy is the commission of a crime, alleging that fact in the charging document obviously would be a sufficient statement of the conspiracy's object," and rejecting the notion that "when the commission of a crime is the object of the indictment, that crime must be charged with the same specificity as if it were the substantive charge"
How later courts described this case
- stating that "[w]hen the object of a conspiracy is the commission of a crime, alleging that fact in the charging document obviously would be a sufficient statement of the conspiracy's object," and rejecting the notion that "when the commission of a crime is the object of the indictment, that crime must be charged with the same specificity as if it were the substantive charge"
- stating that defendant’s failure to file timely motion attacking indictment as defective for omitting specifics of charge of “conspiracy to violate controlled dangerous substances law” constituted waiver of such defects
- noting that the defendant could have demanded a bill of particulars in a case in which he alleged an insufficient indictment
- “Illegal sentences may be challenged at any time, even on appeal.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
*510 ELDRIDGE and McAULIFFE, Judges,
dissenting:
We dissent from the Court’s affirmance of the conspiracy conviction for essentially the reasons set forth by Judge O’Donnell in McMorris v. State, 277 Md. 62, 77-90 , 355 A.2d 438, 447-454 (1976).