holding that, except for Boykin rights (the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the right against self- incrimination), a PCR petitioner claiming that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent must go beyond showing a mere failure in the trial court’s advisements and must also show resulting prejudice
How later courts described this case
- holding that, except for Boykin rights (the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the right against self- incrimination), a PCR petitioner claiming that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent must go beyond showing a mere failure in the trial court’s advisements and must also show resulting prejudice
- explaining that the previous rule, which required strict compliance with the list of advisements, “led to reversal in instances where the trial judge’s omission [could not] genuinely be said to have worked an injustice or, indeed, . . . made any difference at all”
- holding a post-conviction petitioner has a burden to prove not only that the trial judge failed to give an advisement required by statute but also that the judge's failure "rendered his decision involuntary or unintelligent"
- holding that technical failure to inform defendant of minimum sentence in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2(a) was not reversible error
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Redington v. State, 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 287 (1997)
The Majority holdings are simply these: (1) White is inapplicable when a petitioner establishes that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel at a guilty plea hearing pursuant to IC 35-35-1-1; and (2) the admonishments under Wallace, regarding the dangers of self-representation at trial, are inapplicable to determining whether a petitioner knowingly,
The opinion
GIVAN, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with this well-drafted majority opinion with the exception of the last portion of the opinion dealing with the sentencing.
I have reviewed our decision in Groff v. State (1986), Ind., 488 N.E.2d 711 . Al though I originally concurred in that opinion, I now feel it is in error. The statute quoted in the opinion clearly states "(1) [alfter having been arrested for another crime; and (2) [blefore the date he is discharged...." Ind.Code § 35-50-1-2(b). I think it is clear that Groff was in error in saying that in order for the sentences to be consecutive the defendant had to be not only arrested for another crime but also sentenced on his prior crime. To me the clear language of the statute indicates that the consecutive sentence is to be used at any time a crime is committed after the defendant has been arrested for another crime.
The paragraph of the statute referring to discharge from probation and parole or the term of imprisonment simply sets the limitation of the time extent in which the consecutive sentence will be imposed. I now believe Groff should be overruled and the sentence in the instant case affirmed.