holding that, except for Boykin rights (the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the right against self- incrimination), a PCR petitioner claiming that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent must go beyond showing a mere failure in the trial court’s advisements and must also show resulting prejudice
How later courts described this case
- holding that, except for Boykin rights (the right to trial by jury, the right of confrontation, and the right against self- incrimination), a PCR petitioner claiming that his plea was involuntary and unintelligent must go beyond showing a mere failure in the trial court’s advisements and must also show resulting prejudice
- explaining that the previous rule, which required strict compliance with the list of advisements, “led to reversal in instances where the trial judge’s omission [could not] genuinely be said to have worked an injustice or, indeed, . . . made any difference at all”
- holding a post-conviction petitioner has a burden to prove not only that the trial judge failed to give an advisement required by statute but also that the judge's failure "rendered his decision involuntary or unintelligent"
- holding that technical failure to inform defendant of minimum sentence in violation of Ind.Code Sec. 35-35-1-2(a) was not reversible error
Written by the judges who cited it.
Distinguished
Distinguished by Redington v. State, 1997 Ind. App. LEXIS 287 (1997)
The Majority holdings are simply these: (1) White is inapplicable when a petitioner establishes that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to counsel at a guilty plea hearing pursuant to IC 35-35-1-1; and (2) the admonishments under Wallace, regarding the dangers of self-representation at trial, are inapplicable to determining whether a petitioner knowingly,
The opinion
DeBRULER, Justice,
dissenting.
The importance to the community at large, victims of crime, those accused of crime, prosecution and defense forces, and the due administration of the court system; of maintaining the constitutional and legal integrity of a plea of guilty is nothing short of colossal. The vast majority of all criminal cases, including the most serious cases, is disposed of through the conviction without trial, The majority is mistaken in re *907 jecting the present law governing the plea process as the best way to insure the integrity of pleas.
The present law defining the duty of Indiana trial judges finds its source in statements like that of Chief Justice Warren speaking for the U.S. Supreme Court in McCarthy v. United States (1969), 394 U.S. 459, 472 , 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1174 , 22 L.Ed.2d 418 :
It is, therefore not too much to require that, before sentencing defendants to years of imprisonment, district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform them of their rights and to determine whether they understand the action they are taking.
It is my view and one long labored in support of that the judicial responsibility of this Supreme Court in this area is fully satisfied only by requiring Indiana trial judges to make a complete record demonstrating that the judge spoke personally to the accused, advising and interrogating fully, even when he was represented by counsel. And this has been the state legal standard since announced in German v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 234 , and the state constitutional standard since Austin v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1027 . There is a job to be done and the best way to do it is by thoughtful and careful compliance with the requirements of the statute as it was considered by this court in Austin. Today, the court overturns German and takes Indiana backward, settling for second best.
The German rule which mandates setting aside a guilty plea unsupported by a complete record showing that the court complied with the requirements of the guilty plea statute is the product of years of effort by this court in which we unsue-cessfully employed encouraging language to bring about conformance with such requirements. - Furthermore, the policies which support the rule have much greater weight than the one offered in support of its abolition. Among those policies are fairness to the criminal defendant to a maximum degree, integrity and reliability of guilty pleas, incentive for trial judges to follow the law and thus promote respect for judges and the judicial system, facilitation of appellate review, and once the system has adjusted to the rule, which it already has, finality of judgments. The policy in support of the new majority as expressed by Justice Shepard is finality of judgments. Grounds going to the nature of this and all judicial institutions suggest that the court's action today in overruling recent constitutional precedent is imprudent. These cases should not be overturned absent grounds having much the greater weight.
As stated in the majority opinion, the German rule has been in place for five years. It was however, declared prospective only in application thus diminishing the cost attendant to its rigid enforcement aspect. Crocker v. State (1985), Ind., 475 N.E.2d 686 . Five years ago the cost- benefit picture for putting the rule in place was debatable and arguable. Such is not the case today. The costs have now been paid and the present and future benefits are clear; compliance is routine and at the highest level. The majority assessment of future costs is fallacious.
In the White case, now before us, the trial judge advised the defendant of the maximum sentence, but in lieu of telling him the minimum sentence, told him that he could be acquitted if he went to trial. This judge has been reversed four times on this very same point. Jones v. State (1985), Ind., 478 N.E.2d 676 . Williams v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1036 . Austin v. State (1984), Ind., 468 N.E.2d 1027 . Jones v. State (1984), Ind.App., 467 N.E.2d 757 . On the other hand, no other judge of the Marion Criminal Court has ever had a guilty plea declared on appeal to have been deficient because of a failure to advise a defendant of the minimum possible sentence. This tells me that further judgments permitting guilty pleas to be set aside because of non-compliance with the requirements of German and Austin would be minimal in number, and that
*908 cases of this type are not routine at this point in time, but are instead anomalous.
The majority misreads the Austin case. There this court stated:
"An accused's entitlement to such advise-ments, therefore, flow from his due process right to be sheltered from the consequences of a guilty plea entered on less than an informed judgment and not from the legislative inclusion of it in its codification. The legislature may, as a matter of public policy, require advisements that are not of such dimension, but it could not eliminate the requirements of those essential to an informed judgment, which includes the one omitted by the court that accepted the guilty plea.
The gist of this statement is that when it comes to advisements necessary to render an informed decision to enter a plea of guilty it matters not what the legislature does or does not do. Consequently, the statutory analysis in the majority opinion provides little support for the position there taken. The Constitutional source of the above holding is the due process clause; however, it is unclear in the opinion whether it is the U.S. Constitution or the Indiana Constitution wherein it prescribes "due course of law". Surely this ambiguity is no basis upon which to depreciate the fundamental underlying value which is that a defendant ought not to be permitted to plead guilty unless a clear record is made that he understands the minimum sentence which he could receive if convicted of the charged crime.
Compliance with the German rule requiring strict adherence with the guilty plea statute is furthermore simple and inexpensive. The trial court need only keep the statute in hand as a checklist as the personal exchange with the defendant is had. The majority rule on the other hand sanctions a less formal attitude on the part of judges. This will unnecessarily lead to increased complexity and cost of post-conviction litigation. The volume of judicial work in the post-conviction area is not so much determined by the number of cases filed, since that is at the will of the prisoner, as it is by the complexity of litigation. The relaxed judicial attitude which the majority opinion fosters also visits an unnecessary risk upon the system of loss of the basic values safeguarded by the statute and constitutions. Few I believe will fail to 'perceive the view of judicial capacities underlying the majority position, and the skepticism upon which it is based all as being served up with a very highly seasoned sauce.