holding that legislative intent — not a classification of legislation as procedural or substantive— determines the applicability of new legislation to a pending claim
How later courts described this case
- holding that legislative intent — not a classification of legislation as procedural or substantive— determines the applicability of new legislation to a pending claim
- upholding grant of summary judgment to mortgagor when proper notice was not given
- retroactivity is determined by legislative purpose
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CLIFFORD, Justice,
with whom WATHEN, Chief Justice, joins, concurring.
I agree that the notice requirement of 14 M.R.S.A. § 6111 (Supp.1994) applies to the mortgage in this case and that we should affirm the Superior Court. That conclusion can be reached, as the court did, by discernment of legislative intent. The same result is reached by a recognition that applying sec *441 tion 6111 does not constitute a retroactive application of the statute.
Statutes are not to be given retroactive effect unless the intent to do so is clearly expressed. Miller v. Fallon, 134 Me. 146 , 148, 183 A. 416 (1936). Legislation has a retroactive effect only if it changes the legal consequences of events occurring before the statute’s effective date. Norton v. C.P. Blouin, Inc., 511 A.2d 1056 , 1060 n. 5 (Me.1986); Michaud v. Northern Me. Medical Ctr., 436 A.2d 398, 400 (Me.1981); Dobson v. Quinn Freight Lines, Inc., 415 A.2d 814, 816 (Me.1980).
Section 6111 is a notice statute and deals with the procedural steps that have to be taken to effect a foreclosure following a default. It became effective on June 30, 1992, two and one-half months before the mortgage default, and seven months before the Sinclairs instituted foreclosure proceedings. Applying section 6111 to this case does not “determine! ] the legal significance of operative events occurring prior to its effective date.” Accordingly, its application to the mortgage violates no statutory rule of construction.