stating that “intoxication evidence, offered in an attempt to negate the intent necessary for a conviction for murder of the first degree, imposes no new burden on the Commonwealth and creates no new presumption for defendant which the Commonwealth must labor to overcome”
How later courts described this case
- stating that “intoxication evidence, offered in an attempt to negate the intent necessary for a conviction for murder of the first degree, imposes no new burden on the Commonwealth and creates no new presumption for defendant which the Commonwealth must labor to overcome”
- finding that prejudicially ineffective assistance of counsel at the sentencing hearing an arbitrary factor under § 9711(h)
- suggesting that the DAO’s concessions “have been motivated by a policy- based opposition to the severe penalties imposed rather than legal considerations.”
- evidence sufficiently supported first-degree murder conviction despite defense evidence that defendant was intoxicated and that his mind went “blank” at time of murder as jury was entitled to disbelieve defendant’s evidence of intoxication
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
NIX, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In my judgment, appellate counsel’s failure to address the penalty stage in this case evidences a clear demonstration of his ineffectiveness. Even .the most cursory review of the record of the penalty phase rejects out of hand any explana *475 tion that counsel’s lack of complaint as to this part of the proceeding was due to the absence of arguable error. See Commonwealth v. Lohr, 503 Pa. 130 , 468 A.2d 1375 (1983); Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495 Pa. 467 , 434 A.2d 1185 (1981); Commonwealth v. Collier, 489 Pa. 26 , 413 A.2d 680 (1980); Commonwealth v. Perry, 464 Pa. 272 , 346 A.2d 554 (1975); Commonwealth v. Palmer, 455 Pa. 111 , 314 A.2d 853 (1974); Commonwealth v. Greer, 455 Pa. 106 , 314 A.2d 513 (1974); Commonwealth v. Jones, 451 Pa. 69 , 301 A.2d 811 (1973). Moreover, appellate counsel’s conceded credentials conclusively establish his lack of experience and competence to undertake the representation required by this appointment. *
I would, therefore, remand the case to the trial court with the direction that new counsel be appointed to brief and argue all objections relating to the imposition of the death sentence by the jury. Had the majority determined to follow this course, new counsel would have the right to raise all errors his review might uncover without resort to the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel. This is so because we have previously stated that our rules of waiver must be relaxed in capital cases. Commonwealth v. Tra *476 vaglia, 502 Pa. 474, 505-506 , 467 A.2d 288, 304 (1983) (Nix, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. 16 , 454 A.2d 937 (1982); cert, denied sub nom. Zettlemoyer v. Pennsylvania, — U.S. —, 103 S.Ct. 2444 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1327 (1983); Commonwealth v. McKenna, 476 Pa. 428 , 383 A.2d 174 (1978).
The tragedy here is that this defendant, who did not receive even the semblance of competent representation, is being dismissed by the highest court of this Commonwealth so lightly.
Appellate counsel admitted his unfamiliarity with sentencing issues in capital cases, see Pulley v. Harris, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 871 , 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984); Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 , 103 S.Ct. 3418 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 , 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 , 102 S.Ct. 3368 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982); Hopper v. Evans, 456 U.S. 605 , 102 S.Ct. 2049 , 72 L.Ed.2d 367 (1982); Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 , 102 S.Ct. 869 , 71 L.Ed.2d 1 (1982); Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 , 100 S.Ct. 2521 , 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 , 100 S.Ct. 2382 , 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 , 100 S.Ct. 1759 , 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980); Bell v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 637 , 98 S.Ct. 2977 , 57 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1978); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 , 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978); Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282 , 97 S.Ct. 2290 , 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 , 97 S.Ct. 1197 , 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 , 96 S.Ct. 2909 , 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976); and that he had never tried a homicide case.