holding that a police officer’s affirmative response as lay witness to prosecutor’s question concerning whether, during the course of his investigation, the officer had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense, was inadmissible because the question usurped the province of the jury and asked for the officer to comment on the ultimate disputed fact in the case
How later courts described this case
- holding that a police officer’s affirmative response as lay witness to prosecutor’s question concerning whether, during the course of his investigation, the officer had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense, was inadmissible because the question usurped the province of the jury and asked for the officer to comment on the ultimate disputed fact in the case
- holding that a police officer’s testimony that he had reason to believe that “the defendant committed the offense” was especially prejudicial because as a “figure of authority” he was informing the jury that it should believe a portion of the prosecution’s case
- finding a police officer’s testimony that he believed the defendant was guilty “was especially prejudicial because, as an authority figure, - 11 - he was informing the jury that it should believe a portion of the prosecution’s case”
- holding officer’s testimony inadmissible when he––as authority figure––testified to belief defendant was guilty
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
PRESIDING JUSTICE HOMER, dissenting:
The majority holds that Officer Collins’ testimony — that he had reason to believe the defendant committed the offense — was improperly admitted as “opinion testimony.” The fallacy in the majority’s analysis is twofold.
First, the majority fails to properly take into account the admonishment given by the trial court immediately following the testimony. The court instructed the jury that Officer Collins’ testimony was only relevant to show why he did what he did during his investigation. Otherwise, the court informed the jury the testimony was inadmissible. Thus, the court gave a proper limiting instruction.
Second, the majority misconstrues the testimony at issue as “opinion testimony.” Officer Collins was not asked if the defendant committed the offense. Nor was he asked if he believed the defendant committed the offense. Officer Collins was simply asked whether, in the course of his investigation, he had reason to believe that the defendant committed the offense, in other words, whether the defendant was a suspect in the crime. In this context, I do not think the testimony can be fairly construed as opinion testimony in the first place.
As I find no other grounds in the record for reversing the defendant’s conviction, I would affirm it. I would, however, vacate the defendant’s sentence as it clearly violates the rule articulated in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 147 L. Ed. 2d 435 , 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed maximum term of imprisonment for that crime must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 , 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455 , 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63 . Here, the trial court sentenced the defendant to an extended term of four years in violation of Apprendi. Accordingly, I would remand this cause for a new sentencing hearing in order that the trial court might, impose a sentence within the one- to three-year statutory range for a Class 4 felony.