stating that voir dire covers “two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1)' an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service; or (2) an examination of a juror conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him” (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted)
How later courts described this case
- stating that voir dire covers “two areas of inquiry that may uncover cause for disqualification: (1)' an examination to determine whether prospective jurors meet the minimum statutory qualifications for jury service; or (2) an examination of a juror conducted strictly within the right to discover the state of mind of the juror in respect to the matter in hand or any collateral matter reasonably liable to unduly influence him” (internal quotation marks, ellipses, and citation omitted)
- stating that “a trial judge’s jury instruction on the missing witness inference may have the effect of overemphasizing just one of the many proper inferences that a jury may draw.”
- presuming that a judge's instruction to the jury on a permissible inference will be weighed more heavily than counsel's reference to that inference in closing arguments
- explaining and reconfirming this Court's century-long preference for and adherence to limited pretrial voir dire procedure
Written by the judges who cited it.
Later courts went against this
Overruled by Pearson v. State, 437 Md. 350 (2014)
333 Md. 27, 47 (1993), overruled on other grounds by Pearson, 437 Md. at 368
The opinion
McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the result. The Court cannot mandate the asking of voir dire questions designed to aid in the exercise of peremptory challenges because it is impossible logically to frame a limitation on the questions that a judge would then be required to ask. A peremptory challenge may be used for any reason that does not involve impermissible discrimination; thus, the field of inquiry becomes virtually unlimited.
The real problem presented by this case is the method to be used in propounding voir dire questions designed to develop information that could lead to a challenge for cause. Experienced trial counsel and judges realize that a sequence of questions is sometimes the most effective method of focusing the prospective juror’s attention on the legitimate subject matter at hand, and comfortably moving that juror toward a significant end question. More and more, our jurors serve for one trial or one day, and as a result the voir dire procedure is new to many of them. Answers to complicated and compound questions do not come easily, and a confused or nervous juror, in an environment that some may find threatening, may elect to say nothing if he or she is unsure of the meaning of the question or of the response that would be accurate. Simple, sequential questions, however, ease an otherwise difficult process, and are sometimes best calculated to produce truthful and useful information.
On the other hand, there are many questions that could qualify as potential predicate questions which, when coupled ■with others, could lead to the development of information relevant to a challenge for cause, and this Court cannot mandate the asking of all such questions. Again, there is no basis upon which to say that preliminary question “A” must be asked, but preliminary question “B” may be refused. The answer, then, lies in the ability of the trial judge to determine *54 when there is a legitimate desire to explore the existence of cause for disqualification, and when sequential questioning will be beneficial in the pursuit of that inquiry.
It has been my experience that trial judges are quite capable of conducting effective voir dire within acceptable time limitations, and without hamstringing themselves and counsel by allowing only compound questions. Voir dire and jury selection should not be viewed as a nuisance by trial judges. It is an important part of any trial, and the trial judge should have no hesitancy in using the occasion to assist all parties in the search for relevant information.
Likewise, trial judges should not hesitate to restructure unartful questions propounded by counsel when it appears that the information sought would be relevant and the problem with the question is easily rectified. In the instant case, for example, the trial judge might well have asked the panel, in a single question, whether they or any members of their family had ever worked for a law enforcement agency, and as a result of that fact might find it difficult or impossible to render a fair and impartial verdict in the case about to be tried. The benefit of a compound question in that instance is to focus the prospective juror’s attention on a specific circumstance that experience has shown is sometimes a disqualifying factor for a juror, without taking the time to hear from each juror about his or her uncle, aunt, or sister who was a police officer. Given the questions that were asked in this case, I agree that the failure to ask that question was not error. The point I make is that trial judges, with their superior experience in hearing responses of all kinds from prospective jurors, should not hesitate to propound reasonable questions, or even to assist with the framing of a proper question, even when it would not be error to refuse to do so.
Additionally, I do not join the Court’s opinion because of the dictum which at least implicitly suggests that peremptory challenges are somehow less than desirable. I view peremptory challenges, properly used, as a valuable part of our jury system. Recent decisions designed to prevent impermissible *55 discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges have certainly added a layer of complexity to the process, but that is hardly reason to jettison the entire procedure. I continue to have faith in the ability of attentive trial judges, sensitive to the possibility of unconstitutional misuse of challenges, to separate the wheat from the chaff.