holding that 40-or-older restriction in condominium's pre-1985 CC & Rs did not violate the Unruh Act
How later courts described this case
- holding that 40-or-older restriction in condominium's pre-1985 CC & Rs did not violate the Unruh Act
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
CROSBY, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
This case has been reduced by the passage of time to the following, hardly earth-shattering issue: Shall a now 24-year-old man be allowed to reside in a 1,236-unit condominium development with his great-grandmother? I would answer in the affirmative based on Civil Code section 51.3, subdivision (g), which provides in part, “Any person who has the right to reside in, occupy, or use . . . housing . . . subject to this section on January 1, 1985, shall not be deprived of the right to continue that residency, occupancy, or use as the result of the enactment of this section.”
On January 1, 1985, the purported age limitation for this development was 40. That was in clear violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act on that date. (Park Redlands Covenant Control Committee v. Simon (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 87, 94 [ 226 Cal.Rptr. 199 ].) Accordingly, whatever amenities the complex offered seniors at that time, it was not senior citizen housing on the operative date of Civil Code section 51.3; it was housing of the sort condemned in Marina Point, Ltd. v. Wolfson (1982) 30 Cal.3d 721, 742-743 [ 180 Cal.Rptr. 496 , 640 P.2d 115 , 30 A.L.R.4th 1161 ], i.e., so-called “adults only” condominiums calculated to exclude families. Consequently, this development had no lawful age restriction as of January 1, 1985.
The enactment of Civil Code section 51.3 has now legitimized Huntington Landmark as housing for seniors, but only by raising the age restriction *1025 to 55. The 24-year-old man involved here does not meet that requirement, but under subdivision (g) he is a “grandfather” nonetheless (in company with all “adults only” occupants still younger than 55 years).
I would reverse with respect to Shermoen defendants. The Ross matter is moot except for the declaratory relief and attorneys fees issues, and I would also reverse as to them for the reasons stated above.
A petition for a rehearing was denied September 28, 1989, and appellants’ petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied November 21, 1989.