noting that an earlier case “repudiates by implication the ‘common good of all’ test”
How later courts described this case
- noting that an earlier case “repudiates by implication the ‘common good of all’ test”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
Gribbs, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. I would affirm.
The Legislature has granted tort immunity to governmental agencies "engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function”. MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). The Legislature has defined as a governmental function "the acquisition, establishment, construction, enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment and operation of airports”. MCL 259.132; MSA 10.232 (emphasis added).
I disagree with the majority opinion’s determination that the airport statute is intended solely for eminent domain purposes.
In 1945 the Legislature passed Act No. 327 (amended by 1976 PA 191 ), entitled:_
*609 "An act relating to aeronautics in this state; * * * providing for the acquisition, development and operation of airports, landing fields and other aeronautical facilities by the state and by political subdivisions * * (Emphasis added.)
Although a title is not part of an act, it fairly expresses its object and purpose. In re Chamberlain’s Estate, 298 Mich 278, 281 ; 299 NW 82 (1941). The operation of airports by political subdivisions is one of the purposes expressed in the title.
The section of the act dealing with the acquisition and operation of airports provides in pertinent part:
"Every political subdivision in this state is hereby authorized * * * to acquire, establish, construct, enlarge, improve, maintain, equip, operate and regulate such airports, landing fields and other aeronautical facilities * * *.” MCL 259.126; MSA 10.226 (emphasis added).
Thus the operation, as well as acquisition, of airports by political subdivisions is expressly authorized by the Legislature.
Other parts of the aeronautics code support this interpretation. For example, MCL 259.135; MSA 10.235 empowers local governments to accept federal aid in the "acquisition, * * * maintenance, equipment, or operation of airports” channeled through the state treasury. I believe this allows more than federal aid in acquiring lands. It includes aid in the construction and operation of traffic towers and the maintenance of runways. The majority opinion’s interpretation of identical language in § 132 would prohibit local governments from receiving federal aid except for eminent domain. The clear wording of the statutes contradicts this view.
*610 Because the Legislature has, by definition, determined that the maintenance and operation of airports are governmental functions, we need not attempt to sort through the confusing judicial definitions of "governmental function”. See Fulco, Inc v Martin Tropf & Sons, Inc, 36 Mich App 39, 44-45 ; 193 NW2d 194 (1971). Our only consideration is whether the activity complained of stems from the maintenance or operation of Metropolitan Airport.
The plaintiff in her appellate brief concedes that this case is based on the maintenance of the airport. The airport authority is therefore immune from tort liability by legislative definition. I would affirm the circuit court’s summary judgment.