The opinion
Mr. JUSTICE RECHENMACHER, specially concurring:
I differ with the reasoning by which the result was reached, i.e., the holding by the majority that the corrupt practices act is not an absolute liability offense.
In my opinion, a consideration of the facts in this case indicates that ^ there was no “contract” entered into here in the sense intended by the statute.
As this court noted in a footnote in a current opinion, Miller v. County of Lake (1979), 71 Ill. App. 3d 478, 483 , “We recognize that a • situation may arise where a public official’s interest in a contract, upon which he might be called to act or vote, may be so slight as to fail to qualify as ‘an interest in contract’ within the intendment of the Corrupt Practices Act.” I feel such is the case here.
Therefore, I concur with the result while disagreeing with the reasoning. It is my feeling that the statute reads as if absolute liability was intended. I see no basis for the implication in the majority opinion that the language of the act is “obscure” or “its meaning doubtful,” in view of the language of the supreme court in the case of People v. Savaiano (1976), 66 Ill. 2d 7, 14-15 , where the court said:
“We note that the obvious or literal meaning of this statute is apparent and that the offense is defined clearly and without ambiguity.
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The State observes that the statutory language was ‘purposefully broad and inclusive.’ It not only forbids an official from having a private interest in situations in which a binding contract exists but also from allowing himself to be placed in a situation where he may be called upon to act or vote in the making of a contract in which he has an interest. The evil exists because the official is able to influence the process of forming a contract.”
In my opinion, the corrupt practices act is an absolute liability offense. However, for the reasons I have set forth, I agree that the conviction should be reversed.