holding trial counsel has authority to agree to a continuance without the defendant's knowledge and consent
How later courts described this case
- holding trial counsel has authority to agree to a continuance without the defendant's knowledge and consent
- "trial counsel may, at times, be in a position to make strategic or tactical decisions for his client concerning the start of trial. While such decisions may implicate the requirements of Rule 1100, we see no reason why counsel cannot exercise his discretion, weigh the alternatives available, and make an intentional informed choice for his client. The actions of counsel in this regard are imputed to the defendant who is bound thereby."
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the Appellee did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to a speedy trial, as specifically determined by the post-conviction hearing court, I dissent. See, Commonwealth v. Guldin, 502 Pa. 66 , 463 A.2d 1011 (1983) (Zappala, J., dissenting) and Commonwealth v. Crowley, 502 Pa. 393 , 466 A.2d 1009 (1983) (Zappala, J., dissenting).