finding reasonable suspicion when defendant’s vehicle turned into private driveway 75 yards before checkpoint, officer knew some residents of home but had never seen defendant’s vehicle parked there, and occupants of vehicle did not exit after stopping engine *226 and turning off lights but instead turned to observe police activities
How later courts described this case
- finding reasonable suspicion when defendant’s vehicle turned into private driveway 75 yards before checkpoint, officer knew some residents of home but had never seen defendant’s vehicle parked there, and occupants of vehicle did not exit after stopping engine *226 and turning off lights but instead turned to observe police activities
- valid stop occurred when a vehicle pulled into a driveway approximately seventy-five yards before a police checkpoint, the officer believed the vehicle did not belong at that address, and no passengers exited the vehicle within thirty seconds of parking
- reasonable suspicion where vehicle pulled into private driveway 75 yards before checkpoint, vehicle known not to belong to occupants of those premises, and occupants did not leave vehicle but instead turned to watch the police activities nearby
- reasonable suspicion present when car pulled into a driveway 75 yards before the checkpoint and did not exit the vehicle
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
GLASSMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. The issue presented in this case is not that addressed by the court of whether the trial court’s findings of fact were clearly erroneous. The facts in this case are not materially disputed. The defendant, on his appeal to the Superior Court and on the State’s appeal before us, challenges the legal conclusion of the trial court as error for being based on a misinterpretation of the applicable law. Thus, the “clearly erroneous" standard of review is inapplicable. State v. Bollard, 488 A.2d 1380, 1384 (Me.1985). State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931, 933 (Me.1980).
The District Court properly found that the following facts, as articulated in Budge’s testimony, did not justify his stop of D’Angelo’s vehicle: (1) at approximately 11:00 p.m. on June 2 the D’Angelo vehicle turned into a driveway of an apartment house approximately 75 yards from the checkpoint; (2) Budge knew some of the people who lived in one of the apartments; (3) Budge did not recognize the D’Angelo vehicle; (4) the lights and engine of the D’Angelo vehicle were turned off and the three occupants remained in the vehicle for 30 seconds during which time their heads were turned toward the illuminated cones and flashing blue lights at the site of the roadblock. See State v. Caron, 534 A.2d 978, 979 (Me.1987) (suspicion for stop must be based on information available to trooper at time of stop and cannot be bolstered by evidence of driver’s intoxication gathered in post-stop investigation). Given these facts, what then could be the basis for the court’s legal conclusion that Budge had an objectively reasonable suspicion that D’Angelo was engaged in criminal conduct? The District Court stated that “the only justifying basis for this stop is the roadblock. ”
The United States Supreme Court has not, nor heretofore has this court, held that the isolated fact that a roadblock exists justifies the stop of any vehicle within its general vicinity. See Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 , 110 S.Ct. 2481 , 110 L.Ed.2d 412 (1990) (initial stop of motorists passing through a specific checkpoint and associated observation and questioning by officer not violation of fourth amendment); State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (Me.1988) (stop of all vehicles passing through roadblock checkpoint constitutional); State v. Patterson, 582 A.2d 1204 (Me.1990) (stop of vehicle passing through checkpoint and questioning of occupants based on officer’s observation of their conduct in view of checkpoint justified); State v. Powell, 591 A.2d 1306 (Me.1991) (to justify stop of vehicle not passing through roadblock checkpoint officer must have reasonable and articula-ble suspicion occupants engaged in criminal activity).
The mere presence of a roadblock does not eliminate the requirement that there be *72 an objectively reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify the stop of a vehicle not passing through, the checkpoint of a roadblock. Anything less would countenance roving stops, a practice declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 , 99 S.Ct. 1391 , 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). “When such a stop is not based on objective criteria, the risk of arbitrary and abusive police practices exceeds tolerable limits.” Cf. Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 , 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641 , 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). I agree with the Superior Court that based on the facts of this case, together with all rational inferences that can be drawn therefrom, the District Court erroneously concluded that at the time of the stop the existing specific and articulable facts were constitutionally sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion that D’Angelo was engaged in criminal activity. See State v. Griffin, 459 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Me.1983) (standard to assess constitutional sufficiency of factual basis justifying stop). I would affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.