explaining that "constitutional rights are not absolute and the legislature may place reasonable restrictions on constitutional rights,” and concluding that "time limitations [on the right to appeal] provided a reasonable opportunity for those who have been wrongly convicted to demonstrate the injustice of their conviction, and thus, struck a reasonable balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s interest.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
How later courts described this case
- explaining that "constitutional rights are not absolute and the legislature may place reasonable restrictions on constitutional rights,” and concluding that "time limitations [on the right to appeal] provided a reasonable opportunity for those who have been wrongly convicted to demonstrate the injustice of their conviction, and thus, struck a reasonable balance between society’s need for finality in criminal cases and the convicted person’s interest.” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)
- holding that a statute regarding a stay of execution was a substantive act because it “define[d] the appropriate circumstances for securing the substantive right” to a stay rather than setting forth a process for enforcing the stay
- holding that “a lower court may not exercise its inherent right to grant a stay except within the confínes enumerated by § 9545(c)” of the Post Conviction Relief Act
- explaining that the 1988 version of Section 9546(d) governs following *179 this Court's order dated August 11, 1997 which, inter alia, specifically suspended the 1995 and 1997 amendments to Section 9546(d)
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
FLAHERTY, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the court, but wish to emphasize the inherent power of the court to enter a stay in order to effectuate justice. When the legislature is silent, a court can always enter a stay when it is necessary to avoid injustice.
The opinion of the court briefly acknowledges this power, but understandably emphasizes the exception governing this case. When a convict under sentence of death seeks a stay of execution, he is obligated to follow the statutory procedure, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(c), established to control this precise situation. This in no way abrogates the court’s inherent power to grant a stay nor the convict’s right to seek a stay: it merely prescribes the procedure governing exercise of the court’s power and the convict’s rights. Mr. Justice Cap-pas opinion for the court aptly analogizes this situation to the relationship between the PCRA and the right of habeas corpus, whereby a petitioner must seek habeas relief only within the confines of the PCRA or suffer the loss of that right. This being understood, I join the opinion of the court.
As appellant failed to follow the procedure of § 9545(c), I agree that the court lacked the authority to stay the execution.