stating that “the term ‘vest’ generally means either vesting in possession or vesting in interest. Vesting in possession connotes an immediate existing right of present enjoyment, while vesting in interest implies a presently fixed right to future enjoyment,” and holding that an interest had vested in real estate under a constructive trust where the parties would receive a right to enjoy the property as they see fit once the trust no longer had a reason to exist — i.e. when one party’s parents no longer needed use of the residence in question
How later courts described this case
- stating that “the term ‘vest’ generally means either vesting in possession or vesting in interest. Vesting in possession connotes an immediate existing right of present enjoyment, while vesting in interest implies a presently fixed right to future enjoyment,” and holding that an interest had vested in real estate under a constructive trust where the parties would receive a right to enjoy the property as they see fit once the trust no longer had a reason to exist — i.e. when one party’s parents no longer needed use of the residence in question
- noting “[a] constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it” and “[t]he duty to convey the property may arise because the property was acquired through fraud, duress, undue influence or mistake, or through a breach of a fiduciary duty or the wrongful disposition of another’s property”
- “A constructive trust is a creature of equity, devised to do justice by making equitable remedies available against one who through fraud or other wrongful means acquires property of another. A constructive trust is imposed where a person holding title to property is subject to an equitable duty to convey it to another on the ground that he would be unjustly enriched if he were permitted to retain it.”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
RILEY, Judge,
dissenting with separate opinion.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to remand this cause to the trial court with instruction to re-divide the marital real estate consistent with Indiana Code section 831-15-7-5. While I agree with the majority that this cause should be remanded to the trial court with instruction to assign a value to the residence located at 211 North 8th Street and include it in the marital estate, I would instruct the trial court to equally divide the marital estate between Doug and Lisa.
The trial court, in its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, concluded very clearly that "5. The [clourt shall presume that an equal division of the marital property between the parties is just and reasonable." (Appellant's App. p. 22). Furthermore, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the "trial court intended to deviate from an equal division of marital property[.]" Op. at 125. Not only did the trial court fail to state any reasons to deviate from the equal division of the marital estate, there is absolutely no evidence in the record that the trial court was considering or intending an unequal division of the marital estate in favor of Doug. Therefore, I would instruct the trial court to equally divide the marital estate.