ruling that "our statute steers a course between the rock of draconian imposition and the whirlpool of discrimination by requiring death for narrowly defined aggravating circumstances, but allowing an almost unlimited presentation and consideration of mitigation circumstances ..."
How later courts described this case
- ruling that "our statute steers a course between the rock of draconian imposition and the whirlpool of discrimination by requiring death for narrowly defined aggravating circumstances, but allowing an almost unlimited presentation and consideration of mitigation circumstances ..."
- finding that there was no prejudice where the defense strategy applicable to the charge in the information was still applicable to the variance of the charge contained in the jury instructions
- holding amendment that technically violated letter of Rule 229 was permissible because purpose of information was to apprise defen dant of charges so he could prepare adequate defense
- finding that § 9711(h)(3) “provides that [the court] must vacate the death sentence if ... the jury is given a false counter on the side of death”
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent.
I cannot accept the plurality’s conclusion that Appellant was not entitled to a change of venue. While the plurality recognizes that the publicity here was so pervasive that it may have been inherently prejudicial to the Appellant, it then concludes that the publicity was “sufficiently dissipated before the time of trial to allow the defendant to receive a fair trial.” (Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court, pages 444-446).
To this point I must reiterate my belief that where publicity is found to be inherently prejudicial, it is “irrelevant to attempt to then separate that prejudice from thos who may or may not have been affected by it.” Commonwealth v. Romeri, 504 Pa. 124, 140 , 470 A.2d 498, 506 (1983), (Zappala, J. Dissenting). On the basis of that dissent, I would hold that in this instance, where the pre-trial publicity is so pervasive as to be deemed inherently prejudicial, a change of venue must be granted without further inquiry.
I also disagree with the plurality’s “focus of the investigation” discussion relative to the admissibility of Appellant’s pre-arrest statements. It is clear from the findings of the Suppression Court that Appellant was merely a suspect, not the focus of the investigation, when he was first questioned. When he became the focus of the investi *492 gation, Miranda warnings were immediately given to him. As such, he was in custody and the admissibility of his statements need only be examined as the product of custodial interrogation; the focus “analysis” is unnecessary and therefore merely dictum. 1
. Because I find the plurality’s "focus” discussion dictum, I will save for another day a prolonged analysis of my belief that at least under the Pennsylvania Constitution, once a suspect becomes the focus of an investigation, he is to be advised of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to consult with counsel prior to making any statement.