Commonwealth v. Aaron

Dissenting opinion by

BOWES, J.

¶ 1 Although I agree that a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100 (presently Rule 600) occurred in this case, I disagree with the majority’s determination that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in bringing Appellant to trial. I therefore respectfully dissent.

¶ 2 The evidence adduced at the hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss established that the sole reason for the Rule 1100 violation in this case was the trial court’s congested criminal docket. As October 1999 approached, numerous defendants whose Rule 1100 run dates were set to expire before Appellant’s date were still awaiting trial in McKean County, and the Commonwealth logically requested that those cases be listed for trial at the earliest opportunity. Due to the high volume of backlogged criminal cases, the limited number of open trial dates, and the fact that there is only one trial judge in McKe-an County, the Commonwealth knew there was little chance that Appellant’s trial would commence before October 19, 1999. When a capital murder trial was slated to begin in early October, the Commonwealth knew with certainty that Appellant could not be tried before that date. Consequently, the Commonwealth waited until November 19,1999, to contact the McKean County Court Administrator about listing Appellant’s case for trial. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that this fact alone leads to the conclusion that Appellant should be discharged.

¶ 3 It is well-settled that delay occasioned by court congestion can provide a reasonable explanation for failure to try a defendant within the time period prescribed by Rule 1100. Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233 , 627 A.2d 1176 (1993). See also Commonwealth v. Williams, 726 A.2d 389 (Pa.Super.1999); Commonwealth v. Peer, 454 Pa.Super. 109 , 684 A.2d 1077 (1996); Commonwealth v. Smith, 524 Pa. 72 , 569 A.2d 337 (1990). Furthermore, a criminal defendant is not entitled to dismissal of the charges against him if the pretrial delay was occasioned by circumstances beyond the Commonwealth’s control, and the Commonwealth acted with due diligence. Commonwealth v. Hill, 558 Pa. 238 , 736 A.2d 578 (1999). “Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has been put forth.” Id. at 256 , 736 A.2d at 588 (citations omitted).

¶ 4 In previous cases where judicial delay has contributed to Rule 1100 violations, Pennsylvania courts have found that the Commonwealth was diligent when it listed the cases for trial before a violation occurred. See Spence, supra (Commonwealth exercised due diligence where case was assigned to court in regular course of court’s business and trial was delayed because court tried earlier-assigned cases first); Peer, supra (Commonwealth exercised due diligence where defendant’s trial was scheduled prior to Rule 1100 run date and crowded criminal docket was sole reason for delay); Smith, supra (same). Although the Commonwealth admittedly failed to take such action in this case, the majority overlooks the fact that due diligence is a fact-specific concept that may vary from case to case. Hill, supra.

¶ 5 The majority’s rigid analysis ignores the unique circumstances involved herein. Due to the backlog of older cases and the fact the only trial judge in McKean County was involved in a death penalty trial throughout the month of October, the *46 Commonwealth knew for a fact that it had no opportunity to try this case before October 19, 1999; indeed, the judge implicitly acknowledged this fact when he denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the majority states that the Commonwealth did not take any steps “to ensure that Appellant was brought to trial within the time prescribed by Rule 1100.” Majority Opinion at 9. Given the trial court’s docket, there was nothing the Commonwealth could do “to ensure” that Appellant was brought to trial within the time prescribed by the Rule. I believe the Commonwealth acted reasonably when it brought the case to the attention of the Court Administrator in the month of November, at the first actual opportunity that it knew a courtroom was available.

¶ 6 The majority concludes that the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence in this case because McKean County Court Administrator Joanne Bly testified that no one from the district attorney’s office contacted her about scheduling Appellant’s bench trial until November 19, 1999. Moreover, since Ms. Bly indicated that bench trials are easier to schedule than jury trials and usually take less than one-half day to complete, the majority suggests that the Commonwealth easily could have tried Appellant before October 19, 1999. Having reviewed the remainder of the testimony presented at the hearing on Appellant’s motion to dismiss, I disagree.

¶7 The Commonwealth stated on the record that 580 criminal cases were filed in McKean County in 1999. Excluding the month of October, which was devoted entirely to the above-mentioned capital murder trial, Ms. Bly indicated that fifty days were set aside for criminal trials in McKe-an County in 1999. Twenty criminal defendants were tried in the forty-five days set aside between January and November, and three defendants were tried in December. The following synopsis of the cases that were listed for trial in McKean County between August and December 1999 demonstrates that local prosecutors did everything reasonable within their power to see that several cases with Rule 1100 problems were tried as quickly as possible.

¶ 8 Julie Comes, a secretary in the district attorney’s office, testified that five defendants were scheduled for trial during the month of August 1999. Those defendants had the following Rule 1100 run dates: February 18,1999; March 31,1999; April 29, 1999; August 6, 1999; and August 31, 1999. Four defendants were scheduled for trial in September 1999. Their run dates were as follows: November 5, 1998; February 13, 1999; August 7, 1999; and September 2, 1999. As noted swpra, only one defendant was scheduled for trial in October 1999. Four defendants were scheduled for trial in November 1999. Their run dates were April 28, 1999; May 28, 1999; August 21, 1999; and October 29, 1999. Four more defendants were scheduled for trial in December 1999; their run dates were as follows: May 1, 1999; August 19, 1999; August 24, 1999; and September 2,1999.

¶ 9 Although unable to try numerous defendants within the period prescribed by Rule 1100 for reasons beyond its control, the Commonwealth painstakingly identified and monitored cases with Rule 1100 problems in an effort to schedule them for trial as soon as possible. Indeed, as was her custom, the district attorney sent Ms. Bly a letter in November which stated that Appellant’s case needed to be scheduled for trial at the earliest available date. Furthermore, there was no indication that the Commonwealth ever failed to schedule a case on an available trial date or requested a continuance at any proceeding in any case that was pending in McKean County from July until December 1999. As the *47 Commonwealth did not contribute to the delay or ignore Appellant’s right to a speedy trial, I would find that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence under the circumstances.

¶ 10 The result reached by the majority fails to take into account the practical reality of what occurred in McKean County in the fall of 1999. It is apparent from the record that Rule 1100 violations were inevitable, and the Commonwealth made a good faith effort to try every criminal defendant as quickly as possible to avoid prejudicing the defense. Although the majority prefers to decide this case in strict accordance with prior case law, I believe this approach ignores the fact-specific nature of the concept of due diligence and overlooks the sound discretion exercised by the trial court. The judge understood the reason for the Rule 1100 violation in this case and concluded that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence; I see no reason to disturb that determination.

¶ 11 Since. Appellant has not demonstrated that she was prejudiced in any way by the delay attributable solely to the trial court’s congested docket, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

ORIE MELVIN, J. joins in this dissenting opinion.