Opinion

Commonwealth v. Aaron

  • 2002 Pa. Super. 235
  • 804 A.2d 39
  • 2002 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1871
Court
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
Filed
Jul 17, 2002
Status
Published
Author
Lally-Green
On the bench
Sole, Johnson, Hudock, Elliott, Melvin, Lally-Green, Todd, Bender, Bowes
Cited by
41 cases
Authority
More cited than 9.6%

stating that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss charges under Rule 600 where there was no evidence of record that the Commonwealth made an effort to bring case to trial within 365 days

How later courts described this case

  • stating that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to dismiss charges under Rule 600 where there was no evidence of record that the Commonwealth made an effort to bring case to trial within 365 days
  • stating that where compliance with Rule 600 is at issue, the Commonwealth must be proactive and “do everything reasonable within [its] power to see that the case is tried on time.” (citation omitted)
  • “In determining whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to effective prosecution of criminal cases.” (emphasis added)
  • referring to prior Rule of Criminal Procedure 1100

Written by the judges who cited it.

The opinion

Concurring statement by

LALLY-GREEN, J.

¶ 1 While the Opinion of the dissent reflects a persuasive analysis of the issue before us, I concur in the result of the majority’s opinion. I believe the controlling precedent of our Supreme Court compels the majority’s result. Commonwealth v. Hill, 558 Pa. 238 , 736 A.2d 578 (1999); Commonwealth v. Spence, 534 Pa. 233 , 627 A.2d 1176 (1993). In each of the preceding cases, the Commonwealth’s due diligence could be demonstrated once it was shown that the case had been listed for trial before the adjusted run date of Rule 600 (formerly Rule 1100). See also, Commonwealth v. Jackson, 765 A.2d 389, 394 (Pa.Super.2000).

¶ 2 In Appellant’s case, the Commonwealth admits that it listed the case for trial after the adjusted run date. Thus, the condition precedent expressed in our judicial precedent to a finding of “due diligence” did not occur in Appellant’s case.

¶ 3 Our Supreme Court has emphasized that “due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Hill, 736 A.2d at 588 . Accordingly, and as the dissent suggests, the Commonwealth’s due diligence should be a function of the circumstances of the case, whether or not the case is listed for trial after the adjusted run date. I would urge the Supreme Court to refine the standards trial courts use in assessing whether the *45 Commonwealth has exercised due diligence.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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