Russell v. Metropolitan Life Insurance

JUSTICE MILLS, dissenting:

With great respect, I must dissent.

It is true that the case of Marsh v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 790 , 388 N.E.2d 1121 , is essentially indistinguishable from the case before us. However, for those , who are inclined to follow after Marsh and the majority, I suggest they proceed circumspectly.

The principles governing this case are well established. The test of “accidental means” in Illinois is whether the insured’s injury was unintended and unforeseen. (Taylor v. John Hancock Insurance Co. (1957), 11 Ill. 2d 227 , 142 N.E.2d 5 .) The parties stipulated that decedent did not intentionally take his life. Therefore, the question is whether decedent’s death was foreseeable. In determining the foreseeability of an insured’s injury, the courts usually inquire whether the injury was the “natural and probable consequence” of the insured’s conduct. (Yates v. Banker’s Life & Casualty Co. (1953), 415 Ill. 16, 21 , 111 N.E.2d 516 ; Macklin v. Commonwealth Life & Accident Co. (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 119 , 257 N.E.2d 256 ; Rodgers v. Reserve Life Insurance Co. (1956), 8 Ill. App. 2d 542 , 132 N.E.2d 692 .) The Marsh court described the foreseeability standard as follows:

“The test of foreseeability in these circumstances appears to be an objective one, phrased in terms of a contingency ‘known to all sensible men as likely to follow’ as a natural result of one’s conduct. (Hutton v. States Accident Insurance Co., 267 Ill. 267, 269 (1915).) It has also been phrased in the objective terms of a contingency which ‘any man with ordinary intelligence and prudence *** could have reasonably foreseen.’ Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co., 333 Ill. 175, 182 (1928). See also Yates v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 415 Ill. 16, 21-22 (1953).” 70 Ill. App. 3d 790, 792 , 388 N.E.2d 1121,1123 .

In the present case, the trial judge apparently found — as a matter of law — that decedent’s death was unforeseeable and entered summary judgment for plaintiff. The function of an appellate court in reviewing the trial court’s entry of summary judgment is to determine whether the trial court correctly ruled that no genuine issue of material fact had been raised for trial. (United Security Insurance Co. v. Mason (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 982 , 376 N.E.2d 653 ; Szczesny v. W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Corp. (1974), 20 Ill. App. 3d 607 , 315 N.E.2d 263 .) Even where the facts are undisputed, if fair-minded persons may draw differing inferences from those undisputed facts, summary judgment cannot be granted. Cuthbert v. Stempin (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 562 , 396 N.E.2d 1197 ; Gagliardo v. Vodica (1978), 58 Ill. App. 3d 1053 , 374 N.E.2d 1302 .

It is well established that whether the consequences of an insured’s conduct are foreseeable depend upon the facts and circumstances of each individual case. (McCall v. National Life & Accident Insurance Co. (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 737 , 420 N.E.2d 685 ; Macklin v. Commonwealth Life & Accident Co. (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 119 , 257 N.E.2d 256 ; Wylie v. Union Casualty & Life Insurance Co. (1957), 15 Ill. App. 2d 448 , 146 N.E.2d 377 .) Accordingly, the pivotal question before this court is whether a fair-minded person could have inferred from the particular facts and circumstances of this case that decedent’s death was the natural and probable result of his conduct.

The record shows that such an inference could have been made. Decedent had been an alcoholic for many years. Several times he had been found unconscious from drinking too much and, consequently, he must have had an awareness of the effect a certain amount of alcohol would have on him. There was evidence indicating that he was aware of the dangers of alcoholism and that he knew he could die from acute alcohol poisoning by drinking a pint or quart of alcohol. The natural effect of alcohol, when taken in excess, is that of a depressant on the nervous system. It is not improbable that the consumption of alcohol, in an amount great enough to raise the blood-alcohol content to .475 percent, would sedate the nervous system to the point where the heart and lungs cease to function. A fair-minded person could have inferred that decedent’s death was the natural and probable result of his voluntary conduct.

In my view, therefore, summary judgment was improper.

The majority ignores the preceding analysis and adopts the misconceived test of foreseeability espoused in Marsh. This new test is that when a death is no more to be anticipated than the arsonist’s death in Taylor, no factual question exists and the death is unforeseeable as a matter of law. The majority gives no explanation, no principled analysis, as to how it determined that an alcoholic’s death from acute alcohol poisoning is no more foreseeable than an arsonist’s death from an ill-timed fire. As the court in Marsh, the majority here is silent with respect to how a court is to quantitatively appraise the foreseeability of a given death and then compare it with the foreseeability of a death occurring under entirely different facts and circumstances. Future “accidental means” cases may now be decided by mere intuition rather than through principled analysis.

The supreme court in Taylor directed us away from Justice Cardozo’s Serbonian Bog by holding that “accidental means” is synonymous with “accidental results.” It appears the majority has found another path to that marshy ground.