award was not rationally derived from CBA which clearly retained employer's right to determine appropriate punishment for serious misconduct, where, despite the fact that the arbitrator found grievants to have engaged in charged abusive conduct to an inmate of the prison, including assaultive behavior, arbitrator also considered certain mitigating factors to find no "just cause" for dismissal, and substituted a lesser penalty
How later courts described this case
- award was not rationally derived from CBA which clearly retained employer's right to determine appropriate punishment for serious misconduct, where, despite the fact that the arbitrator found grievants to have engaged in charged abusive conduct to an inmate of the prison, including assaultive behavior, arbitrator also considered certain mitigating factors to find no "just cause" for dismissal, and substituted a lesser penalty
- Arbitration Act of 1927 provisions relative to judicial review of arbitral awards retained in Uniform Arbitration Act, thus, it is clear that the “essence” test remains the standard of judicial review for arbitration awards which, are subject to section 7302(d)(2) of the Uniform Arbitration Act
- the agreement between the parties specifically stated that the arbitrator could only decide, the question of fact as to whether there was just cause for discipline and reserved to the County the right to determine the type of discipline imposed
- award was not rational where arbitrator found grievants to have engaged in abusive conduct to an inmate of the prison, including assaultive behavior, but arbitrator considered certain mitigating factors to find no “just cause” for dismissal and substituted a lesser penalty
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
LARSEN, Justice,
concurring.
I join the majority opinion. I wish to emphasize that, as the majority observes, judicial intervention in labor arbitration awards is and should be the rare exception. So long as the arbitrator “essentially” (i.e., reasonably) derives the award from the collective bargaining agreement, the award will not be disturbed.
Here, however, as in Philadelphia Housing Authority v. Union of Security Officers # 1, 500 Pa. 213 , 455 A.2d 625 (1983), the union did not bargain for and the employer did not bargain away the right and responsibility of the employer to discharge an employee who is guilty of the atrocious criminal conduct that we witness in these cases. In the instant case, the sustained physical abuse, humiliation and torture of the victim-inmate (which is undisputed) in the guards’ “care” (e.g., handcuffing and shackling, forced enemas, shaving of hair, exposing private areas, inflicting pain to and offensive touching of the genitals and buttocks, etc.), clearly violated the criminal laws of this Commonwealth prohibiting, inter alia, rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and assault. A public employer cannot bargain away its right and responsibility to discharge an employee for such egregious criminal behavior occuring in the performance of the employee’s duties; such a bargain would violate public policy. The Centre County Prison Board did not attempt to bargain away that right and responsibility, and the arbitrator in this case, without a doubt, roved far beyond the collective bargaining agreement to dispense his own notion of justice. This award cannot be permitted to stand.
PAPADAKOS, J., joins in this concurring opinion.