ruling in capital-murder prosecution that while defendant's statement that he purchased a shotgun because he was "having trouble with some niggers in New Jersey," was properly admitted by the State as rebuttal evidence and was relevant to defendant's state of mind and that counsel is given considerable leeway in cross-examination, statement should have been excluded because its limited relevance was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature
How later courts described this case
- ruling in capital-murder prosecution that while defendant's statement that he purchased a shotgun because he was "having trouble with some niggers in New Jersey," was properly admitted by the State as rebuttal evidence and was relevant to defendant's state of mind and that counsel is given considerable leeway in cross-examination, statement should have been excluded because its limited relevance was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial nature
- finding reversible error in prosecutor's summation in which he argued that the defense expert's testimony was fabricated, extolled the jury to "send a message" by sentencing defendant to death, stated, without evidentiary support, that defendant extorted food from other inmates while in prison, and instructed the jury that it was legally required to impose the death penalty
- concluding that that type of argument is "improper and prejudiced defendant's penalty-phase proceeding," where the prosecutor "urg[ed] the jury to sentence defendant to death in order to deter him from future acts of violence and to `send a message' to society that conduct such as defendant's will result in the death penalty"
- holding that trial court should have given limiting instruction to jury when inflammatory evidence of defendant's bigoted remarks was admitted to demonstrate defendant's intent, and that evidence should have been excluded, in any case, under Evidence Rule 4
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
WILENTZ, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I dissent from the majority’s disposition of the guilt phase. Aggravated manslaughter should have been charged. As to the rest of the case, I concur and join in the majority opinion.
*550 On the facts of this case, a jury could find that defendant, rather than intending death or knowing that death was practically certain, was motivated solely by a desperate desire to avoid apprehension. One could find that he shot the victim without intending to kill and without knowing that what he did was practically certain to result in the victim’s death. A state of mind does not necessarily precisely track the definitions of the Code. A defendant may be devoid of any state of mind concerning the victim other than the wish to escape the consequences of having committed a separate crime.
A fair inference from the facts of this case is that defendant acted as a result of panic. Panic, of course, can induce an act that defendant knows is practically certain to result in death; that it was caused by panic is no excuse. But panic can also induce a mindless act — unaware, uncaring, concerned solely for defendant’s survival, and totally unconcerned with the consequences to others. That state of mind — recklessness “manifesting extreme indifference to human life” — is the defining aspect of aggravated manslaughter under the Code. N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-4a. The facts in this case, though more strongly suggestive of a purposeful or knowing murder, may reasonably be taken to suggest that state of mind. The jury should have been allowed to decide the issue. See State v. Crisantos (Arriagas), 102 N.J. 265, 278 (1986) (“the rational-basis test of the Code imposes a low threshold ... for permitting a charge on a lesser-included offense”).