The opinion
GATES, J.
I concurin my colleagues’ decision to the extent that it determines that in this instance the petitioner is entitled to the evidentiary hearing he seeks. I decline, however, to speculate what such evidence, when introduced, may or may not establish regarding the reliability of polygraph testing or its acceptance in today’s scientific community.
I also deem it important to stress the most limited nature of the question presently before us. During his oral presentation before this court, petitioner’s counsel emphasized the fact that petitioner (1) heretofore has offered to undergo further polygraph testing by “qualified examiners” 1 selected by the People or appointed by the court, or both, and (2) stands willing to fully cooperate with any other orders that may be promulgated by the trial court to ensure the integrity, accuracy, and fairness of any evidence relating to such tests, including the one he has heretofore taken. 2
*36 It is, of course, well established that evidence regarding polygraph examinations is of sufficient relevance and probative value that it will be received in a criminal proceeding in this State if the parties have so stipulated. (People v. Trujillo (1977) 67 Cal.App.3d 547, 554 [ 136 Cal.Rptr. 672 ], and People v. Reeder (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 235, 238 [ 135 Cal.Rptr. 421 ], and cases cited therein.) The only novel-question to be resolved by the hearing to be conducted in this instance is: “Has the theory and practice of polygraphy today achieved that degree of reliability and acceptance that a trial court may now promulgate rules for its receipt even though one party to the proceeding, here the People, initially has declined to have experts of its choosing conduct appropriate tests of a witness for the other party, here the defendant himself, despite the fact such witness has manifested his willingness to submit himself thereto and it is agreed that the results of all such tests, will thereafter be admissible whether favorable or unfavorable to either side?”
In People v. Duck Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 178, 189 [ 133 Cal.Rptr. 511 , 555 P.2d 297 ], our Supreme Court rather clearly indicated that, as with all questions regarding any potential field of expertise, defendants must, from time to time, and upon proper and timely showings, be permitted to examine into the advancements that have been made therein in an effort to establish that sufficient reliability and acceptability has been achieved to warrant receipt of opinion evidence regarding it. (See also People v. Adams (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 109 [ 125 Cal.Rptr. 518 ].)
I agree with my colleagues that it certainly would have been preferable for the Legislature, rather than the courts, to have undertaken the type of lengthy and in depth analysis that must be conducted in order adequately and properly to explore and evaluate the myriad arcane nuances of polygraphy. In view of the many “battles of the experts” that now engage our courts and excite the interest of press and public alike, even the not overly cynical observer 3 might be forgiven a small involuntary shudder of apprehension at the prospect of seeing yet another area of strife developed, particularly one that is to delve directly to the very core of every judicial proceeding, i.e., the credibility of witnesses.
*37 We can but hope that whatever determination ultimately may be made in the instant proceeding, the Legislature will promptly move to establish what it perceives to be the truly appropriate rules, regulations, restrictions or out right bans, that should prevail in this most important and vexed area. For the present, however, I can but agree that since either condemnation or affirmation prior to investigation is always inappropriate, petitioner is entitled to his day in court.
A petition for a rehearing was denied July 19, 1982, and the petition of real party in interest for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied August 18, 1982.
Naturally it must be understood that this expression assumes that there is evidence sufficient to establish that the state of the polygraphic art has now advanced to the point that there are persons to whom such an appellation may properly be applied.
Petitioner’s counsel further stated that he had no objection to the People administering similar tests to their witnesses and introducing the results into evidence. We dared *36 not inquire if he also believed that those experts who conduct polygraph tests should themselves be examined before trial by other experts in order to verify the content of their testimony, etc.
A truly cynical onlooker might conclude that poor and lonely indeed is he who can-riot locate at least one “expert” to express a favorable opinion on any given subject.