commenting on the unsettled law in the area of admission of expert testimony
How later courts described this case
- commenting on the unsettled law in the area of admission of expert testimony
Written by the judges who cited it.
The opinion
HOFFMAN, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in the result. However, the time has come for clarification rather than cogitation.
As noted by the majority, the decision whether to allow expert testimony lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Fox v. State (1987), Ind., 506 N.E.2d 1090, 1095 . Also as noted by the majority, mention of the Frye test has been conspicuously absent from some recent decisions by our Courts.
See e.g. Valinet v. Eskew (1991), Ind., 574 N.E.2d 288, 286 ;
Peavler v. Board Com'rs (1990), Ind.App., 557 N.E.2d 1077, 1083 , trans. den.
In Hopkins v. State (1991), Ind., 579 N.E.2d 1297, 1805 , Justice Dickson's concurring opinion, joined by Justice Krahulik, calls into question the efficacy of the Frye test in Indiana. The opinion concludes:
"Considering the existing disagreement regarding whether the Frye reliability standard should govern admissibility, and the fact that neither of the parties in the present case presents a serious challenge to its acceptance in Indiana, the analysis employed by the majority should not be construed as an endorsement or rejection of the Frye methodology. Resolution of this important question remains for another day."
Id. at 18307.
Review of the cases reveals a general rule regarding the admissibility of testimony by experts. When the trial court determines the trier of fact will be assisted in understanding evidence or in determining a fact in issue, testimony of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge gained by a witness qualified as an expert through skill, experience, training or education is admissible. See Summers v. State (1986), Ind.App., 495 N.E.2d 799, 802-803 , trans. den.
Although as noted in Summers, supra, 495 N.E.2d at 808 , the present trend is toward allowing expert testimony if it will render assistance to the trier of fact, here the trial court did not abuse its discretion *135 in excluding the testimony addressing the unreliability of eyewitness identification. Such testimony is analogous to testimony regarding whether a witness is telling the truth. "No witness, whether lay or expert, is competent to testify that another witness is or is not telling the truth." Stewart v. State (1990), Ind., 555 N.E.2d 121, 125 ; see also Ulrich v. State (1990), Ind.App., 550 N.E.2d 114, 115 .